Unconscionability and Article 2 Implied Warranty Disclaimers by Phillips, Michael J.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 62 Issue 2 Article 4 
April 1986 
Unconscionability and Article 2 Implied Warranty Disclaimers 
Michael J. Phillips 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael J. Phillips, Unconscionability and Article 2 Implied Warranty Disclaimers, 62 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 199 
(1985). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol62/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
UNCONSCIONABILITY AND ARTICLE 2 IMPLIED
WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS
MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS*
For some time, the body of scholarly commentary' on the uncon-
scionability doctrine established by U.C.C. section 2-3022 has been quite
substantial. Within that body of commentary, section 2-302's effect on
disclaimers3 of the U.C.C.'s implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose is a frequently discussed issue.4 These
discussions, however, are usually rather brief.5 Thus, the unconsciona-
bility of implied warranty disclaimers seems to have eluded extended
treatment until now.
6
* Associate Professor of Business Law, School of Business, Indiana University. B.A., Johns
Hopkins University, 1968; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1973; LL.M., National Law
Center, George Washington University, 1975; S.J.D., National Law Center, George Washington
University, 1981.
1. Eg., Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or Term, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 337 (1970);
Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); Epstein, Unconscionability: A
Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975); Hillman, Debunking Some Myths about Unconscio-
nability: A New Framework for UCC. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1981); Leff, Uncon-
scionability and the Code: The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Left]; Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the Common Law Tradition,
31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 349 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Leff II]; Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscio-
nability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1969); Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA.
L. REV. 931 (1969); Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L.
REV. 359 (1970).
2. For a general description of § 2-302, see infra notes 115-58 and accompanying text.
3. U.C.C. §§ 2-316(2), (3) deal with implied warranty disclaimers. For a general discussion of
these sections and their operation, see infra notes 58-81 and accompanying text. Except as it bears
on the application of § 2-302 to implied warranty disclaimers, this article is not concerned with the
unconscionability of remedy limitations under U.C.C. § 2-719(3). On the distinction between dis-
claimers of liability and limitations on the buyer's remedies, see, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-11, at 471-72 (2d ed.
1980). On the possible application of U.C.C. § 2-719(3) in the implied warranty disclaimer context,
see infra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
4. The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness are established by U.C.C. §§ 2-314
and 2-315, respectively. For a general discussion of these sections, see infra notes 7-57 and accompa-
nying text.
5. Such discussions include the following: 3 R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES AND BULK
TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7.03[2] (1985); E. FARNSWORTH, CON-
TRACTS § 4.28, at 318-19 (1982); 2 W. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-
316:08 (1982); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-6, at 161-62, § 12-11, at 475-81;
Braucher, supra note 1, at 343; Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 793-803; Leff, supra note 1, at 520-25;
Metzger, Disclaimers, Limitations of Remedy, and Third Parties, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 686-87
(1979); Spanogle, supra note 1, at 956-58.
6. So far as I can discern, the only sources treating the unconscionability of implied warranty
disclaimers at any length are Fahlgren, Unconscionability: Warranty Disclaimers and Consequential
Damage Limitations, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 435, 437-45 (1976); Comment, Unconscionability and the
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This article attempts to remedy the deficiency just identified by ex-
haustively discussing section 2-302's application to disclaimers of the im-
plied warranties of merchantability and fitness. It opens with an
overview of the two implied warranties, the methods for disclaiming
them, and the doctrine of unconscionability. It then examines in detail
the sizeable body of cases considering section 2-302's application in the
implied warranty disclaimer context, and the issues presented by these
decisions. The final section of the article is a wide-ranging policy discus-
sion that attempts to establish section 2-302's proper role in the implied
warranty disclaimer context. As a result of this discussion, the article
concludes by urging that section 2-302 should be aggressively applied to
invalidate disclaimers of the implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness.
I. BACKGROUND
The cases discussing the unconscionability of implied warranty dis-
claimers result from the convergence of three distinct sets of rules created
by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: its implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness, the provisions governing disclaimers of these
warranties, and the unconscionability doctrine created by section 2-302.
This section briefly reviews each of these matters in turn.
A. The Implied Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness
1. The Implied Warranty of Merchantability
No discussion of the major theories of product liability recovery7 is
Enforcement of Standardized Contracts in Commercial Transactions, 16 PAC. L.J. 247 (1984); Note,
28 S.D.L. REV. 186 (1982).
7. Throughout the remainder of this article, comparisons to these theories will appear in the
text and in the notes. The most important such theory is section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS (1965), which provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
Section 402A has been adopted by the courts of 36 states and the District of Columbia. Nine other
states have adopted variants of section 402A. See I PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) para. 4016, at 4026-27
(1984).
Also, negligence remains a significant cause of action in the product liability context. For a
description of its operation in that context, see W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN,
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complete without the Uniform Commercial Code's implied warranty of
merchantability. This warranty is created by U.C.C. section 2-314(1),8
which states in relevant part that: "a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind." 9 This warranty arises by
operation of law, and does not depend on the seller's actual assent to its
terms. It is an obvious example of a tendency that pervades twentieth
century American contract law: government dictation of the terms of
private contracts, usually with the aim of protecting the weaker party. 10
To recover under section 2-314, a plaintiff who has dealt directly
with the defendant seller" must show that: 1) a merchant 12 sold goods;13
2) these goods were not merchantable at the time of sale; 3) the plaintiff
suffered injury or economic loss; 14 4) this injury or loss was caused proxi-
mately and in fact by the goods' failure to meet the merchantability stan-
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 96 (1984) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON]. In addition, U.C.C. § 2-313 allows recovery for breach of an express warranty. Section
2-313(1) states that such warranties are created by: 1) any affirmation of fact or promise relating to
the goods sold; 2) any description of the goods; or 3) any sample or model of the goods. In each
case, the behavior creating the warranty must be "part of the basis of the bargain." Id. § 2-313(1).
For a discussion of express warranties under Article 2 of the Code, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 3, §§ 9-2 to 9-5. Finally, cf 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (1982) (the consumer civil action provi-
sion of the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B
(1965) (allowing recovery for certain misrepresentations by a seller of goods to a consumer).
8. Also, U.C.C. § 2-314(3) states that "other implied warranties may arise from course of
dealing or usage of trade."
9. The precursor of § 2-314 is UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15(2). For a discussion of the pre-Code
implied warranty of "merchantableness," see L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 89 (2d
ed. 1959).
10. On this general tendency, see, e.g., W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 129-57
(2d Penguin ed. 1972).
11. On the problems still created by the traditional no-liability-outside-privity rule in the im-
plied warranty context, see infra note 35.
12. See U.C.C. § 2-104(1). The most important kind of merchant defined by this section is a
party "who deals in goods of the kind [sold]." This includes business professionals such as jewelers,
hardware stores, and used car dealers who regularly deal in particular products. Section 2-104(1)
also defines a merchant as one who "by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction." This language seems principally
directed toward those who use or install goods in the performance of some service. See J. WHITE &
R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 9-6, at 345. In such cases, of course, it is possible that Article 2 will be
inapplicable because the transaction will be characterized as one predominantly involving a service,
not the sale of goods. See infra note 13 and R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES
§ 22, at 46-47 (1970) (which discusses the mixed goods-services problem).
13. Goods are basically movable things. U.C.C. § 2-105(1). For Article 2's definition of the
term "sale," see id. § 2-106(1). For general discussions of the transactions that may or may not
qualify as sales of goods subject to Article 2, see R. NORDSTROM, supra note 12, §§ 20-22; T. QUINN,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST paras. 2-105, 2-106 (1978 & 1985
Cumulative Supplement). Also, U.C.C. § 2-314(1) specifically includes within its coverage "the
serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere."
14. On the various kinds of damages obtainable in a successful implied warranty suit under
Article 2, see infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
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dard;15 and 5) the defendant received notice16 of the injury or economic
loss. 17 Perhaps the most important question presented by suits proceed-
ing under section 2-314 is the definition and application of the term
"merchantability." U.C.C. section 2-314(2) presents an elaborate list of
traits that goods must possess if they are to conform with this standard. 18
The most important 19 such trait is section 2-314(2)(c)'s statement that
the goods must be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used." This portion of the merchantability test is plainly a broad,
discretionary standard designed to encompass the wide range of goods
marketed in the United States today and the even wider range of defects
they can present.20 Obviously, the goods do not have to be perfect to
satisfy section 2-314(2)(c). 21 Most of the cases presenting a failure to
satisfy the merchantability standard have involved situations where the
goods simply failed to work properly, or were unexpectedly harmful.
22
2. The Implied Warranty of Fitness
The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose created by
U.C.C. section 2-315 covers a much narrower range of situations than
the implied warranty of merchantability. 23 Section 2-315 states that:
"Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any par-
ticular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is... an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose."' 24 This warranty most commonly arises in situations where a
business purchases goods that must be selected, manufactured, and/or
15. This causation requirement is discussed in J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 9-8.
16. See U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (which states that the buyer must give notice within a reasonable
time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach of the sale contract).
17. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 9-6, at 343 (listing a similar set of elements).
18. U.C.C. § 2-314(2) provides that:
Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quan-
tity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.
For a general discussion of these requirements, see R. NORDSTROM, supra note 12, § 76.
19. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 9-7, at 353.
20. Cf T. QUINN, supra note 13, para. 2-314; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 9-7
(both indicating the range of situations the merchantability standard covers).
21. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 9-7, at 356.
22. Id. § 9-7, at 351.
23. Id. § 9-9, at 358 (fitness warranty narrower, more specific, and more precise).
24. The forerunner of § 2-315 is UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15(1). For a discussion of the pre-
Code analogues of the 2-315 fitness warranty, see L. VOLD, supra note 9, § 90.
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assembled to meet its special needs. 25
In addition to such standard requirements as a sale of goods, notice,
causation, and injury or economic loss, 2 6 a plaintiff seeking recovery
under section 2-315 must meet certain additional requirements directly
imposed by the section and its comments. Specifically: 1) the seller must
have reason to know the particular purpose for which the buyer seeks the
goods; 2) the seller must also have reason to know that the buyer is rely-
ing on the seller's skill or judgment to select suitable goods; and 3) the
buyer must in fact rely on the seller's skill or judgment. 27 If these tests
are met and the goods fail to satisfy the particular purpose for which they
were purchased, there is a breach of the implied warranty of fitness. In
order to establish the first two requirements just stated, the buyer need
only show the seller's reason to know of the buyer's particular purpose
and of his reliance on the seller's skill or judgment; actual knowledge is
not required.28 The third requirement (the buyer's actual reliance) is not
set forth in the text of section 2-315, but appears in Comment 1 to that
section.
29
The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose differs from
the implied warranty of merchantability in several significant respects.
First, section 2-315 imposes different tests for recovery. While the seller
need not be a merchant for section 2-315 to apply, that section's other
requirements tend to limit the contexts in which the implied warranty of
fitness will arise. The implied warranty of merchantability, on the other
hand, has a fairly wide sweep. Perhaps the most important distinction
between the two warranties, however, concerns the different quality stan-
dards they create. Under section 2-314, the goods must be fit for the
ordinary purposes for which they are used, while under section 2-315 the
goods must satisfy the buyer's particular purpose. 30 In some cases,
25. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 9-9, at 359.
26. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. It is probably reasonable to assume that the
privity problem mentioned in supra note 11 and accompanying text will arise less frequently in the
fitness warranty context than in the § 2-314 context. On the whole, buyers purchasing goods se-
lected, manufactured, or assembled for their special purposes should most often deal directly with
the firm doing the selecting, manufacturing, or assembling; and such buyers are relatively unlikely to
transfer such goods to another party.
27. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 9-9, at 358.
28. As U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 1 declares:
Under this section the buyer need not bring home to the seller actual knowledge of the
particular purpose for which the goods are intended or of his reliance on the seller's skill or
judgment, if the circumstances are such that the seller has reason to realize the purpose
intended or that the reliance exists.
29. "The buyer, of course, must actually be relying on the seller." Id.
30. As id., Comment 2 states:
A "particular purpose" differs from the ordinary purpose for which the goods are used
in that it envisages a specific use by the buyer which is peculiar to the nature of his business
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though, both implied warranties may be breached. Goods so defective as
not to be fit for any purpose, for example, may subject the seller to liabil-
ity under each theory.
3. The Continuing Importance of the U.C.C.'s Implied Warranties
Despite the increased emphasis on tort-based theories that has ac-
companied the "product liability explosion" of recent decades, the
U.C.C.'s implied warranties remain significant bases of product liability
recovery. This is admittedly more true of the implied warranty of
merchantability than of the implied warranty of fitness, since the latter
tends to have a localized application. 31 At first glance, though, even the
implied warranty of merchantability seems less useful to product liability
plaintiffs than tort theories such as negligence and section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.32 The traditional "no liability outside
privity of contract" rule, for instance, now has little vitality in negli-
gence33 and section 402A 34 cases. But it is still a significant obstacle to
recovery in some implied warranty suits. 35 Moreover, seller waivers or
whereas the ordinary purposes for which goods are used are those envisaged in the concept
of merchantability and go to uses which are customarily made of the goods in question.
For example, shoes are generally used for the purpose of walking upon ordinary ground,
but a seller may know that a particular pair was selected to be used for climbing
mountains.
31. Also, the express warranty recovery allowed by U.C.C. § 2-313, see supra note 7, remains
important. Plainly, however, it can only be utilized where the defendant has acted in one of the ways
stated by § 2-313(1).
32. On those theories, see supra note 7.
33. On the demise of the no-liability-outside-privity defense in negligence cases, see W. PROS-
SER & W. KEETON, supra note 7, § 96, at 681-83. "The rule that has finally emerged is that the
seller is liable for negligence in the manufacture or sale of any product which may reasonably be
expected to be capable of inflicting substantial harm if it is defective." Id. at 683.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(b) states that: "The rule stated in Subsec-
tion (1) applies although ... the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller." After giving some examples, id., Comment 1 declares that:
"The liability stated is one in tort, and does not require any contractual relation, or privity of con-
tract, between the plaintiff and the defendant." However, Caveats (1) and (3) to § 402A express no
opinion about the application of its rule to plaintiffs other than users or consumers of the product, or
to defendants who are sellers of a component part of a product to be assembled. Comments o and q
to § 402A seem vaguely sympathetic to 402A's application in such situations, but, due to the absence
of relevant case law at the time they were written, likewise decline to express an opinion on the
matter. However, the courts applying § 402A have often allowed it to be used by remote parties not
specifically falling within the categories of "user" or "consumer." For a general discussion listing
the wide range of remote parties capable of using § 402A, see 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN
LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 4:23-4:25 (1974). In particular, the section has frequently been
utilized by bystanders. Id. § 4:25.
35. As Professors James White and Robert Summers have declared: "It may be impossible to
write briefly but not superficially about privity [under Article 2 of the Code]." J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 11-2, at 399. This article makes no attempt at a full treatment of this
immensely complex subject. For a fairly complete discussion, see id. §§ 11-2 to 11-6. This problem
is formally governed by the three versions of U.C.C. § 2-318, but the courts often have not felt
themselves constrained by the section's language. In general, the main factors affecting the plaintiff's
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disclaimers of negligence3 6 and 402A 37 liability are quite unlikely to suc-
ceed in cases involving ordinary consumers. As the next section demon-
strates, however, disclaimers are much more likely to block liability in
the implied warranty context.38 Further, the typical tort statute of limi-
tations is sometimes more advantageous to plaintiffs than Article 2's stat-
ute of limitations.3 9 Finally, unlike suits proceeding under the U.C.C.,4°
chances of implied warranty recovery outside privity are: 1) whether the loss suffered was a foresee-
able consequence of the product defect (a factor suggested by the "reasonable to expect" and "rea-
sonably to be expected" language of various versions of § 2-318); 2) the status of the plaintiff
(consumers being in the best position to recover); and 3) the type of damages sought (see infra note
56 and accompanying text).
36. The courts are not in complete unanimity regarding the tests for a valid waiver of negh-
gence liability in the defective goods context. Almost invariably, they require relatively equal bar-
gaining power or a relatively equal bargaining position between the parties. E.g., Sterner Aero AB v.
Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1974); Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom
Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 150 (3d Cir. 1974); Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 143 Ariz. 368, 383, 694 P.2d 198, 213 (1984). Often, they require that
these parties be business or commercial entities. E.g., Keystone, 499 F.2d at 150; Salt River, 143
Ariz. at 383-84, 694 P.2d at 213-14. In addition, it is often necessary that the waiver be clear and
unambiguous, or that it specifically mention negligence liability. See, e.g., Keystone, 499 F.2d at 150.
Some courts further require actual, knowing negotiation and bargaining regarding the waiver. E.g.,
Salt River, 143 Ariz. at 384-85, 694 P.2d at 214-15. Finally, it is often said that such waivers are to
be strictly construed. E.g., Keystone, 499 F.2d at 150. See generally D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PROD-
UcTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL 105-07 (2d ed. 1981). Thus, it is quite unlikely that a waiver of
negligence liability will be effective where a consumer buys a product manufactured by a large
corporation.
37. "The consumer's cause of action ... is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement,
whether it be between the seller and his immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying the
product into the consumer's hands." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m
(1965). However, in Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir.
1974), the court, while finding a disclaimer invalid in a 402A suit because the disclaimer was insuffi-
ciently clear and unequivocal, id. at 150, still stated that Pennsylvania law permits a freely negoti-
ated and clearly expressed waiver of 402A liability between business entities of relatively equal
bargaining strength, id. at 149. Other courts, though, have followed Comment m in business or
commercial cases. See, e.g., Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir.
1974). On this subject, see D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, supra note 36, at 102-05.
38. This is mainly due to the basic provisions of U.C.C. § 2-316. See infra notes 58-81 and
accompanying text. However, restrictions on the seller's ability to disclaim implied warranty liabil-
ity are increasing. See, e.g., infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text. In particular, as the second
section of this article demonstrates at length, the unconscionability doctrine created by U.C.C. § 2-
302 is an increasingly important check on the ability to disclaim implied warranties.
39. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) provides that: "An action for breach of any contract for sale must be
commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued." Id. § 2-725(2) states that: "A
cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowl-
edge of the breach." Id. It also states the general rule that: "A breach of warranty occurs when
tender of delivery is made." Id. Thus, the implied warranty plaintiff may be denied recovery in
cases where the defect becomes manifest more than four years after the sale. The typical tort statute
of limitations, on the other hand, is for a period of two years or less. But it usually begins to run at
the time of the injury, or the time the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the injury. J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 11-9, at 416. Despite their shorter time period, tort statutes
of limitations are clearly more advantageous to the plaintiff in cases where the injury occurs well
after the sale. In response to this situation, some courts have employed the tort statute of limitations
in implied warranty suits (especially those involving personal injury or property damage). See id.
§ 11-9, at 416-18 and accompanying notes. On the whole problem, see id. § 11-9.
40. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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there is no notice requirement in tort cases. 4'
These difficulties notwithstanding, the Code's implied warranties
possess significant advantages over negligence and section 402A in cer-
tain situations. First, the plaintiff in an implied warranty suit is only
required to show that the product is not merchantable or that it failed to
satisfy the buyer's particular purpose. The negligence plaintiff, on the
other hand, must prove that the seller failed to act as a reasonable person
would have acted under the circumstances. 42 Of course, the strict liabil-
ity rule announced by section 402A eliminates this need to prove a
breach of duty.43  When compared with the implied warranty of
merchantability, however, section 402A presents its own special obstacle
to recovery.44 Under section 402A, the plaintiff must not only show that
the product was defective, but that this defective condition made it "un-
reasonably dangerous. ' 45 This latter requirement means that the prod-
uct must be "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordi-
nary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.
'46
Under the implied warranty of merchantability, on the other hand, only
simple defectiveness (the product's failure to be fit for the ordinary pur-
poses for which it is used) is needed for recovery.
Also, the damages sought by the plaintiff are a significant variable in
determining the theory or theories under which to sue. Generally, a
plaintiff who mounts a successful 402A suit can only recover for property
damage47 and personal injury.48  The situation is a bit more uncertain
41. D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, supra note 36, at 123-24.
42. "[Where] the liability is to be based on negligence, the defendant is required to exercise the
care of a reasonable person under the circumstances." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 7, at
684. See generally id. at 684-89.
43. "The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although.., the seller has exercised all possible
care in the preparation and sale of his product." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a)
(1965).
44. Also, some states still have not adopted § 402A. See supra note 7.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1965). See supra note 7.
46. Id., Comment i. it is generally held that the product's "unreasonably dangerous" nature is
an indispensable element of a 402A case. R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 34, § 4:14, at 678.
But, as this source notes, some courts have eliminated the "unreasonably dangerous" element. E.g.,
Azzarello v. Black Bros., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020, 1025-27 (1978). Also, some 402A cases
employ a form of risk-benefit analysis that effectively blurs the distinction between "defective condi-
tion" and "unreasonably dangerous." See, e.g., Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97 (5th Cir.
1978).
47. This is damage to property of the plaintiff other than the defective product.
48. The language of § 402A suggests such a limitation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A(1) (1965) ("physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his prop-
erty"). Also, "[p]erhaps a majority of jurisdictions have denied recovery for economic loss in strict
tort cases." D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, supra note 36, at 116. By "economic loss," the authors are
referring to the basis of the bargain damages and indirect economic loss defined in infra notes 49-50.
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when the plaintiff sues in negligence, but there is still a distinct tendency
to deny recovery for basis of the bargain damages49 and indirect eco-
nomic loss 5° in negligence cases. 51 In implied warranty suits, where the
plaintiff has dealt directly with the defendant, however, all four types of
recovery 52 are possible.53  Admittedly, outside privity, the implied war-
ranty plaintiff is less likely to succeed and may not be able to recover at
all. 54 And, even where recovery is not blocked on other grounds,5 5 cer-
tain kinds of damages are very difficult to obtain outside privity of con-
tract. In general, the implied warranty plaintiff who lacks privity of
contract with the defendant, but is otherwise entitled to recover, has a
reasonably good chance of obtaining personal injury or property damage
and relatively little chance of obtaining basis of the bargain damages or
indirect economic loss.
56
What all of this suggests is that one or both of the Code's implied
warranties is likely to be the theory of choice where the plaintiff is seek-
ing a basis of the bargain or indirect economic loss recovery from a de-
fendant with whom he dealt directly. This is especially so where a
breach of duty is difficult to prove and the product is merely defective
(not dangerously defective). In general, these factors are most likely to
49. Basis of the bargain damages (or "direct economic loss") represent the loss of the value of
the bargain. The typical measure of such damages is the value of the goods as warranted minus the
value of the goods as actually received. As this formulation suggests, basis of the bargain damages
typically are obtainable only in contract cases.
50. Indirect economic loss (or "consequential economic loss") is a catchall category including
forms of consequential damages other than personal injury or property damage. Typical examples
include lost profits and loss of business goodwill.
51. See D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, supra note 36, at 113-14 (generally no recovery in negligence
for economic loss). But see id. at 112-13 (economic loss recovery possible where this conjoined with
personal injury or property damage). The example given by the authors, however, involves indirect
economic loss; and it is unlikely that basis of the bargain damages are recoverable in a negligence
suit.
52. However, punitive damages are usually not obtainable under the UCC. See, e.g., E. FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 5, § 12.8, at 842 & n.16. Cf U.C.C. § 1-106 (penal damages not available except
as provided by UCC or other rule of law); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-8, at 168-69
(discussing the availability of punitive damages in the unconscionability context).
53. See U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (basis of the bargain damages); id. § 2-715(2)(a) (indirect economic
loss); id. § 2-715(2)(b) (personal injury and property damage). For recovery of indirect economic
loss, the loss must have resulted from general or particular requirements and needs of the buyer of
which the seller had reason to know at the time of contracting. For recovery of personal injury or
property damage, the injury or damage must have "proximately" resulted from the breach of
warranty.
54. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
55. These "other grounds" include factors such as the status of the plaintiff and whether it was
foreseeable that the injury or other loss would result from a particular defect in the goods. See supra
note 35.
56. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 11-3, at 403 (personal injury); id. § 11-4, at
405-06 (property damage); id. § 11-5, at 407 ("direct economic loss"-i.e., basis of the bargain dam-
ages); id. § 11-6, at 409 ("consequential economic loss"-i.e., indirect economic loss). See generally
id. §§ 11-3 to 11-6.
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be present where the plaintiff is a business person or entity buying for
business purposes in a commercial setting. Negligence and section 402A,
on the other hand, are usually better suited for personal injury and prop-
erty damage cases, especially those where privity of contract is absent.
Such cases, of course, tend to be consumer suits.
7
B. Implied Warranty Disclaimers
1. The Basic Tests of U.C.C. Section 2-316(2)
U.C.C. sections 2-314 and 2-315 both contemplate the possibility
that the implied warranties they establish may be disclaimed,5 8 and spe-
cifically refer to U.C.C. section 2-316 while doing so. 9 For our pur-
poses, 6° the most important portion of section 2-316 is its subsection (2),
which provides in relevant part that: "[T]o exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in the case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to
exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be
by a writing and conspicuous." Through these requirements, the Code
"seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of
disclaimer by ... permitting the exclusion of implied warranties only by
conspicuous language ... which protect[s] the buyer from surprise.
61
Although they do impose interpretative problems,62 section 2-
316(2)'s tests are fairly mechanical. To disclaim 63 the implied warranty
of merchantability, the seller must use the word "merchantability," and,
if the disclaimer is in writing, 64 must make it conspicuous. To disclaim
the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the seller must
57. Indeed, it has been held that § 402A has no application where parties of relatively equal
bargaining power who are dealing in a commercial setting bargain the specifications of the product
and negotiate concerning the risk of loss from defects in that product. Eg., Scandinavian Airline
Sys. v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425, 428-29 (9th Cir. 1979).
58. Section 2-316 deals only with exclusions and modifications of liability, not remedy limita-
tions. See the discussion at infra notes 172-79 and accompanying text, which discusses remedy
limitations under Article 2 and distinguishes them from disclaimers.
59. Before stating the rule in supra text accompanying note 9, U.C.C. § 2-314 conditions it by
including the words "Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316(2))." Id. § 2-315 conditions the
rule stated in supra text accompanying note 24 by including the words "unless excluded or modified
under the next section" between the terms "there is" and "an implied warranty."
60. Id. § 2-316(1) deals with attempted disclaimers of express warranty liability. For a discus-
sion of this provision, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, §§ 12-2 to 12-4.
61. U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1.
62. See generally T. QUINN, supra note 13, para. 2-316; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3,
§ 12-5.
63. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) also controls attempts to modify implied warranties (as for instance by
limiting their duration). J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 12-5, at 437-38.
64. Thus, U.C.C. § 2-316(2) seems to contemplate oral disclaimers of the implied warranty of
merchantability.
UNCONSCIONABILITY AND ARTICLE 2
use a writing and must make the disclaimer conspicuous. No particular
form of words is needed to disclaim an implied warranty of fitness. 65
Perhaps the most significant interpretative problem66 posed by sec-
tion 2-316(2) is its "conspicuousness" requirement. U.C.C. section 1-
201(10) defines the term "conspicuous" as follows:
A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a rea-
sonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it.
A printed heading in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF
LADING) is conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is "con-
spicuous" if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color. But in a
telegram any stated term is "conspicuous." Whether a term or clause
is "conspicuous" or not is for decision by the court.
Although courts construing its language in the 2-316(2) context may
have to consider such technical matters as the location of the dis-
claimer 67 and the degree to which it contrasts with the rest of the con-
tract, 68 section 1-201(10) seems to resolve the conspicuousness question
in a fairly definite fashion. But since the basic test of a term's conspicu-
ousness "is whether attention can reasonably be expected to be called to
it,"69 the courts sometimes consider the overall bargaining context while
applying the section, and sometimes depart from its literal language
when doing so. Although disclaimers are often strictly construed against
sellers,70 for example, they are more likely to be enforced where the
buyer is a party of some business sophistication and bargaining power.71
In fact, even an inconspicuous disclaimer may be enforced if the seller
actually points out the disclaimer to such a business buyer,72 or if a buyer
of this sort actually reads the disclaimer. 73 On the other hand, there is
ordinarily no requirement that the buyer be aware of a conspicuous dis-
claimer before it will be enforceable. 74
65. The last sentence of U.C.C. § 2-316(2) provides an illustrative form of language that (if
conspicuous) will disclaim the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. It provides:
"Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that
'There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof.' "
66. Another such problem involves disclaimers made subsequent to the time of the contract.
On this subject, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 12-5, at 445-46.
67. T. QUINN, supra note 13, para. 2-316(A)(10)(c), at 2-176; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 3, § 12-5, at 442.
68. T. QUINN, supra note 13, para. 2-316(A)(10)(g), at § 2-172-73 (1985 Cum. Supp.).
69. U.C.C. § 1-201, Comment 10.
70. E.g., FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 418-19 (5th Cir. 1980). See also J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 12-5, at 440 & n.57.
71. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 12-5, at 441 & n.59.
72. Id. at 444 & n.77.
73. See Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 783-85 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
74. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 12-5, at 443-44 (generally agreeing with
proposition in text but noting a case to the contrary). Nothing in U.C.C. § 2-316(2) imposes a
requirement that the buyer be actually aware of the disclaimer. In addition, the general test of
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2. Other Ways to Disclaim
U.C.C. section 2-316(3) creates a number of exceptions to section 2-
316(2)'s basic requirements by listing various alternative ways to dis-
claim. 75 These alternatives involve "common factual situations in which
the circumstances surrounding the transaction are in themselves suffi-
cient to call the buyer's attention to the fact that no implied warranties
are made or that a certain implied warranty is being excluded."
'76
U.C.C. section 2-316(3)(c), a catchall provision, allows implied war-
ranties to be disclaimed by course of dealing, course of performance, or
usage of trade.77 Section 2-316(3)(a) states a particularized application
of this rule78 by providing that "unless the circumstances indicate other-
wise, all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like 'as is,' 'with
all faults' or other language which in common understanding calls the
buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that
there is no implied warranty. '79 Even though section 2-316(3)(a) does
not directly authorize this, many courts have held that such expressions
must be conspicuous if they are to disclaim implied warranty liability.80
Also, section 2-316(3)(a)'s clause "unless the circumstances indicate
otherwise" has provided an avenue for occasional rulings that the section
should not apply to consumer transactions and to sales of new goods.
8 1
Comment 10 to id. § 1-201(10), see supra text accompanying note 69, is phrased as an objective
standard ("reasonably to be expected"). However, the buyer's knowledge of the disclaimer may be
relevant in the unconscionability context. See, e.g., infra notes 225, 223, 255 and accompanying text.
And, as section III of this article maintains at many points, knowledge of the disclaimer is an impor-
tant policy consideration that should affect its enforceability.
75. One of these alternatives is only peripherally relevant here because it does not involve a
"disclaimer" in the usual sense of the term. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b) and Comment 8 to § 2-316 prevent
the buyer from mounting an implied warranty suit with respect to a reasonably apparent product
defect where: 1) the buyer examines the goods before the sale and either fails to discover such a
defect or disregards it and purchases the goods anyway; or 2) the seller demands that the buyer
inspect the goods and the buyer fails to do so.
76. U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 6.
77. For definitions of the terms "course of dealing," "course of performance," and "usage of
trade," see U.C.C. §§ 1-205(1), (2); 2-208(1). For a discussion of § 2-316(3)(c), see J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 12-6, at 454-57.
78. "The terms covered by paragraph (a) are in fact merely a particularization of paragraph (c)
which provides for exclusion or modification of implied warranties by usage of trade." U.C.C. § 2-
316, Comment 7.
79. A comment to § 2-316 adds the term "as they stand." Id.
80. T. QUINN, supra note 13, para. 2-316(A)(10)(c), at 2-177 to 2-178; J. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 3, § 12-6, at 450.
81. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 12-6, at 448-49. The reason for denying effect to
such terms in consumer cases is that some consumers may be unaware of their meaning and conse-
quences. Also, such terms may be regarded as inapplicable to new goods in certain commercial
contexts.
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3. Statutory Limitations on the Ability to Disclaim
Implied Warranties
Except for the unconscionability problems discussed below, sellers
who utilize the basic format authorized by U.C.C. section 2-316(2) would
seem to have little difficulty disclaiming implied warranty liability. How-
ever, there are various statutory limitations on the ability to disclaim im-
plied warranties. Several states, for instance, have forbidden implied
warranty disclaimers in various contexts.8 2 Perhaps the most common of
these measures is a ban on the enforceability of such disclaimers in sales
of consumer goods.
8 3
Also, the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act84 puts severe limits
on the seller's ability to disclaim implied warranties in sales of consumer
goods to consumers. The Act is basically a disclosure provision,8 5 and it
also establishes certain consumer remedies.8 6 For present purposes, how-
ever, its most important feature is a provision stating that a seller who
gives a written warranty in connection with the sale of consumer goods
87
costing more than $10 per item must designate the warranty as "full" or
"limited. ' 8 8 Sellers thereby compelled to give a full or limited warranty
cannot disclaim or modify any state-created implied warranty in a sale of
a consumer product to a consumer.89 A seller who gives a full warranty
also cannot limit the duration of any implied warranty. 90 However, a
seller who gives a limited warranty may limit the duration of any appli-
cable implied warranty "to the duration of a written warranty of reason-
able duration, if such limitation is conscionable and is set forth in clear
and unmistakable language and prominently displayed on the face of the
warranty." 91
Nothing in the Magnuson-Moss Act compels a seller to give a writ-
82. See 3 R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra note 5, § 7.03(4); Millspaugh & Coffinberger,
Sellers' Disclaimers of Implied Warranties: The Legislatures Strike Back, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 160, 163-67
(1980).
83. E.g., MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-316.1 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1984); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1984).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1982).
85. See id. § 2302(a), (b). See also 16 C.F.R. Parts 701, 702 (1984) (stating FTC regulations
regarding disclosure of warranty terms and conditions, and pre-sale availability of written warranty
terms).
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (1982).
87. The Act basically defines a "consumer product" as "any tangible personal property which
is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes."
Id. § 2301(1). See also 16 C.F.R. § 700.1 (1984) (elaborating on the Act's definition).
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a), (d) (1982); 16 C.F.R. § 700.6 (1984). On the required contents of
a full warranty, see 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1982).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (1982).
90. Id. § 2304(a)(2).
91. Id. § 2308(b).
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ten warranty, 92 and sellers who decline to do so can escape the provisions
just described. Such sellers presumably could still disclaim the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness by including a writing to that
effect along with the goods sold.93 Competitive realities, however, may
often dictate that a written warranty be given. In such cases, the seller's
ability to disclaim implied warranty liability obviously is quite limited
where consumer goods are sold to a consumer.
C. The Doctrine of Unconscionability
1. Outside Article 2 of the U.C.C.
Prior to the promulgation and adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code, unconscionability was mainly an equitable doctrine. 94 It seems to
have been used most often as an argument for denying specific perform-
ance95 of contracts for the sale of land.96 In such contexts, formulations
of the applicable unconscionability standard were usually quite vague.
97
Perhaps the most familiar is the statement that a court should refuse to
enforce contracts "such as no man in his senses and not under delusion
would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would ac-
cept on the other."
'98
Equity courts attempting to inject some content into such nebulous
standards ordinarily considered a wide range of factors. In most of the
cases, both an unfair bargaining process and unfair substantive terms
were present.99 Included under the former heading were all kinds of
trickery, unscrupulous behavior, and abuse of a superior bargaining posi-
tion that did not rise to the level of fraud, duress, or undue influence. 1°°
Also relevant were the relative abilities of the parties. 101 As for the sub-
92. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 9-13, at 371.
93. Also, the seller might orally disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability where no
written warranty has been given.
94. For general discussions of unconscionability's role in equity, see J. CALAMARI & J. PE-
RILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9.38, at 318-19 (2d ed. 1977); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5,
§ 4.27, at 302-05; Leff, supra note 1, at 528-41.
95. See. e.g., Leff, supra note 1, at 531. However, courts occasionally would cancel or rescind
the contract as well. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 4.27, at 305-06.
96. "Almost without exception, actions for specific performance were (and are) brought with
respect to transactions involving real property." Leff, supra note 1, at 534.
97. See, e.g., the examples quoted in E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 4.27, at 302, 304.
98. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (1750), quoted in
E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 4.27, at 304.
99. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 4.27, at 304 (bargain usually infected with something
more than substantive unfairness).
100. Id.
101. Within the ambit of those factors of contract-procuring behavior which would result in
a denial of specific performance, a bewildering number of permutations work to inform the
chancellor's discretion. In these cases one runs continually into the old, the young, the
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stantive terms of the contract, it seemed to be agreed that a gross dispro-
portion between the obligations assumed by each party (and not mere
inadequacy of consideration) was necessary before the unconscionability
doctrine would be invoked.
10 2
It is unclear whether both kinds of unconscionability-an unfair
bargaining process and unfair substantive contract terms-were neces-
sary for an equity court to refuse specific performance. °3 Where the
substantive terms were fair, it is extremely doubtful whether the courts
concerned themselves with unfairness in the bargaining process.'
°4
Where the substantive terms were unfair, on the other hand, there was
considerable disagreement about the need for "bargaining process" un-
fairness. The question, that is, was whether substantive unfairness was a
sufficient (and not just a necessary) condition for denying specific
performance. '0 5
In actions at law, by contrast, the principles just stated generally did
not apply.'0 6 In theory, at least, a party arguing that he be allowed to
avoid an unjust or oppressive bargain was limited to such traditional "es-
cape doctrines" as fraud, duress, and undue influence. In cases not coy-
ignorant, the necessitous, the illiterate, the improvident, the drunken, the naive and the
sick, all on one side of the transaction, with the sharp and hard on the other.... Certain
whole classes of presumptive sillies like sailors and heirs and farmers and women continu-
ally wander on and off stage. Those not certifiably crazy, but nonetheless pretty peculiar,
are often to be found.
Leff, supra note 1, at 531-33 (footnotes omitted).
102. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 4.27, at 302-03. It has also been argued that courts as-
sessing the substantive terms of the contract looked to all of these terms in order to determine
whether an overall imbalance existed. Leff, supra note 1, at 538 ("gross overall imbalance"). For
some elaboration on this idea of overall imbalance, see id. at 509-16 (discussing the drafting history
of U.C.C. § 2-302). This is different from what Professor Leff has termed "one-clause naughtiness,"
id. at 513, whose concern is with the specific clause of the contract that harmed the party alleging
unconscionability. On this, see id. at 513-16 (again discussing the drafting history of § 2-302) and id.
at 538 (discussing opposite view in equity context and suggesting that one-clause unconscionability
not the prevailing approach in equity).
103. Cf E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 4.27, at 304 (threshold for denial of equitable relief
denies precise formulation). For a discussion of the analogous problem presented by the cases dis-
cussing U.C.C. § 2-302, see infra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
104. Leff, supra note 1, at 538-39 (no one doubted that inadequate overall consideration at least a
necessary cause for denial of specific performance).
105. This important fact, that all of the equity unconscionability decisions really depend
upon a finding of inadequate overall consideration, has been obscured by the fact that the
really live issue in this area, the subject of a controversy lasting centuries, was not whether
inadequate consideration was a necessary cause of the denial of specific performance, but
whether it was a sufficient cause.
Id. at 538 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original).
106. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 94, § 9-38, at 320; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5,
§ 4.27, at 306. However, it has been said that unconscionability could bar enforcement of a contract
in an action at law in extreme cases like those suggested by the text accompanying supra note 98.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208, Comment b (1981); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
supra note 94, § 9-38, at 320. For some other situations where enforcement would be denied at law,
see E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 4.27, at 306 (discussing certain fiduciary relationships).
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ered by such doctrines, however, common law courts often manipulated
standard contract rules to achieve results paralleling the results that un-
conscionability made possible in equity.107  As Karl Llewellyn once
stated, though, such "[c]overt tools are never reliable tools, ' 10 8 and the
courts in fact did not employ them in a consistent, predictable fashion. 0 9
The dissatisfaction created by such covert manipulation, coupled with
the perceived need to continue policing unjust bargains, encouraged the
promulgation and enactment of U.C.C. section 2-302.110
Section 2-302 is discussed immediately below, but our present con-
cern is with its influence outside the sale of goods context controlled by
Article 2 of the U.C.C. 1" Since the adoption of section 2-302, some
courts have chosen to apply its rule in cases not involving the sale of
goods." 2 Also, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts includes an un-
conscionability rule quite similar to section 2-302.113 Finally, provisions
resembling section 2-302 have been included in a number of other uni-
form acts."1
4
2. Under the Uniform Commercial Code
The Section and its Mechanics. U.C.C. section 2-302, Article 2's un-
conscionability provision," 5 states that:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
107. In general.... courts of law have not directly condemned a contract as unconscionable
but have resorted to imaginative flanking devices to defeat the offending contract. The law
courts searched for and found (even though not present under ordinary rules) failure of
consideration, lack of consideration, lack of mutual assent, duress or fraud, inadequacy of
pleading, lack of integration in a written contract or a strained interpretation after finding
ambiguity where little or no ambiguity existed.
J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 94, § 9-38, at 320 (footnotes omitted). See also E. FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 5, § 4.26, at 295-99.
108. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939) (reviewing 0. PRAUSNITZ,
THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW
(1937)).
109. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 94, § 9-38, at 320-21.
110. See id. at 321.
111. U.C.C. § 2-102. Although this article is not concerned with the precise coverage of Article
2, it should be noted that some of the cases discussed in section II of this article involve leases of
goods.
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208, Reporter's Note, Comment a (1981);
E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 4.28, at 308 & n.7; and cases cited by each source.
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981), which provides:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to
avoid any unconscionable result.
For the text of U.C.C. § 2-302, see infra text following note 115.
114. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 4.28, at 308 n.10.
115. On the drafting history of 2-302, see Leff, supra note 1, at 489-501, 509-16; Spanogle, supra
note 1, at 938-42.
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clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce
the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid
any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract
or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be af-
forded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commer-
cial setting, purposes and effect to aid the court in making the
determination.
As the section expressly declares, the unconscionability determination is
to be made by the court.1 16 To aid the court in making this determina-
tion, subsection (2) requires that the parties be given a reasonable oppor-
tunity to present evidence regarding the contract's commercial setting,
purpose, and effect. 1 7 The party alleging unconscionability has the bur-
den of proof on that issue, and must show that the contract was uncon-
scionable at the time of its formation (and not some later time). 118 Once
the court decides that the contract or one of its clauses is unconscionable,
it has at its disposal the wide range of remedial alternatives described in
subsection (1). 119
The Meaning and Application of Section 2-302. The key inquiries in
almost all unconscionability cases, of course, are the term's meaning and
its application in the relevant factual context. For better or worse,
1 20
there is no precise answer to the first question.1 21 Neither the Code nor
its comments give a specific definition of the word "unconscionable."
Also, the indeterminate, self-contradictory language of Comment 1 to
section 2-302122 also provides little definite guidance. Thus, section 2-
116. "The present section is addressed to the court, and the decision is to be made by it."
U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 3.
117. The trial court's failure to provide such an opportunity may be grounds for reversal of an
unconscionability finding. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-3, at 150. See also id. at 150-
51 n. 17 (providing further detail on § 2-302(2)'s hearing requirement).
118. Id. at 150.
119. Usually, the unconscionability doctrine is used defensively and is not the basis for recovery
of damages. Id. For an elaboration of this proposition and some qualifiers to it, see id. § 4-8.
120. See infra notes 360-65 and accompanying text (suggesting that open-endedness of § 2-
302(1) inevitable if genuine policing of bargains to occur, and that this indefiniteness therefore quali-
fiedly desirable).
121. E.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-3, at 151 ("[ilt is not possible to define
unconscionability") (emphasis in original); Braucher, supra note 1, at 337 (unconscionability "un-
ruly horse"); Hillman, supra note 1, at 1-2 (§ 2-302 gives judges great power to police agreements
but provides "little coherent guidance" on how to do so); Spanogle, supra note 1, at 931 (concept of
unconscionability "vague").
122. In relevant part, U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1 provides that: "The basic test is whether, in
the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or
case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing
at the time of the making of the contract." Later, the comment declares that: "The principle is one
of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise ... and not of disturbance of allocation of risks
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302(1) is often regarded less as a rule of law' 23 than as an occasion for the
exercise of case-by-case judicial discretion. As Professors White and
Summers have stated unconscionability "is not a concept, but a determi-
nation to be made in light of a variety of factors not unifiable into a
formula." 1
24
As this last remark suggests, courts deciding unconscionability
claims typically consider a range of factors whose application will vary
with the factual context. In structuring these factors, the sometimes-crit-
icized 125 but widely recognized t26 distinction between "substantive" un-
conscionability and "procedural" unconscionability is fairly useful.'
27
As its name suggests, substantive unconscionability involves the substan-
tive terms of the contract and the relative benefits and burdens they cre-
ate for the parties. Courts making this kind of inquiry, of course, are
concerned about substantive terms that impose excessive burdens on one
party, or unfairly benefit the other. 128 Procedural unconscionability, on
the other hand, concerns various sorts of unfairness in the process of
contracting.129 Inquiries of this type generally focus on various kinds of
"bargaining naughtiness"'' 30 giving one party an unfair advantage over
because of superior bargaining power." This much-quoted language plainly is very imprecise. "Ex-
perimentation with even a single case shows this litmus to be useless; in no sense is the comment an
objective definition of the word [unconscionable]. It is simply a string of hopelessly subjective syno-
nyms laden with a heavy 'value' burden: 'oppression,' 'unfair,' or 'one-sided.'" J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-3, at 151. Indeed, since many unconscionability cases involve situations
where superior bargaining power has produced a one-sided allocation of risks, the quoted comment
language is self-contradictory in many of the common contexts where the doctrine is applied. "The
dilemma is: If courts are now supposed to explicitly police against contracts or clauses which are
unconscionable,... how can a court help but disturb the allocation of risks?" Murray, supra note 1,
at 40. See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-3, at 151 (making the same point).
123. Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 759 (unconscionability not a "rule" but a "standard").
124. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-3, at 151.
125. E.g., Hillman, supra note 1, at 3-4, 21 (distinction raises more questions than it solves
because it offers no guidance on how to employ the factual elements labeled "substantive" and "pro-
cedural"); Murray, supra note 1, at 21 (these factors need not be rejected, but do little to advance
analysis).
126. E.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-3, at 151 (accepting the distinction as
framework for discussion); Braucher, supra note 1, at 338 (distinction superior to other analytical
frameworks); Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 762 n.20 (accepting distinction with apparent misgivings);
Leff, supra note 1, at 487 (seeming origin of the distinction).
127. Although it obviously had antecedents in pre-Code law, see supra notes 99-102 and accom-
panying text, the procedural-substantive distinction seems to have formally originated with Leff,
supra note 1, at 487. Of course, this framework is merely a way to organize the factors relevant to
unconscionability determinations. It does not tell us what weight to give each substantive or proce-
dural factor; nor does it state whether both procedural and substantive unconscionability are needed
for an overall determination that a contract or contract term is unconscionable. Hillman, supra note
1, at 3-4. On the latter question, see infra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
128. Cf. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-3, at 151 ("overly harsh terms"); Leff,
supra note 1, at 487 ("evils in the resulting contract").
129. Leff, supra note 1, at 487.
130. Id.
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the other.
Of the substantive contract provisions that might trouble courts ap-
plying section 2-302, perhaps the most frequent offender is the price
term.131 Most other instances of substantive unconscionability involve
"remedy meddling"'132 in its various forms. Examples include contract
clauses that: impose liquidated damages for the buyer's non-accept-
ance, 133 limit the seller's liability for consequential damages, 134 give the
seller excessive repossession rights, 35 waive defenses136 or the right to a
jury trial, 137 or submit disputes to the courts of a particular jurisdic-
tion. 1 38 (And, as we will see, implied warranty disclaimers may be sub-
stantively unconscionable as well.) It seems likely that substantive
unconscionability can result both from the effect of a single such clause,
and from an overall imbalance in the terms of the contract. 139 In the
latter case, however, it is not evident just how onerous a single term must
be before it will be deemed substantively unconscionable. 
40
The many factors relevant to determinations of procedural uncon-
scionability can be grouped under three general headings: 1) the parties
and their characteristics; 2) the way the contract states and packages the
substantively offensive terms; and 3) the seller's sales tactics.' 4' Under
the first heading, a disparity in bargaining power between the parties is
widely regarded as a significant factor, 142 though not a decisive one."43
The absence of such a disparity, on the other hand, may often suggest
that the contract is conscionable. Commercial deals between business
professionals, for instance, are quite likely to survive allegations of un-
131. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-5; Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 787-92.
132. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-5, at 160.
133. Id.
134. This is discussed at infra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
135. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-6, at 160.
136. E.g., Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 806-08; Spanogle, supra note 1, at 959.
137. Spanogle, supra note 1, at 960.
138. Eg., Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 803-05; Spanogle, supra note 1, at 960.
139. Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 776 ("single clause" and "overall imbalance" unconscionability
supplement each other). See id. at 775-86. See also supra note 102 (discussing the pre-Code posture
on this question).
140. One formulation of a test applicable to standard form contracts goes as follows. Printed,
non-bargained terms are too one-sided if they: 1) alter or impair the fair meaning of the bargained
terms, or 2) are manifestly unreasonable. Spanogle, supra note 1, at 945.
141. Another factor that seems to be mainly procedural even though it involves the substance of
the deal is the goods' status as luxuries or necessities. In the former case, it has been argued, uncon-
scionability is less likely because the buyer's need to purchase the product is less intense. See Hill-
man, supra note 1, at 43; Spanogle, supra note 1, at 955.
142. See, e.g., Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 765-68 (generally treating disparity of bargaining
power as a factor to be considered).
143. E.g., Braucher, supra note 1, at 341 (bargain not unconscionable merely because bargaining
positions of parties unequal); Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 766 (mere disparity of bargaining power,
without more, not sufficient for unconscionability finding).
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conscionability.'" In consumer cases, however, the consumer's igno-
rance,' 45 lack of education, 46 inability to understand English, 47 and
inability to comprehend contract terms 148 are often significant reasons
for determining that unonscionability exists.' 49 It has even been sug-
gested that one's general status as "poor" or "disadvantaged" may merit
consideration. 150 Turning to the second group of factors, it is commonly
claimed that unfavorable contract terms that are stated in fine print,
well-buried amidst other clauses, or expressed in incomprehensible
legalese may be categorized as procedurally unconscionable. 151 Finally,
sales induced by seller trickery, guile, and high-pressure tactics are also
procedurally suspect.' 52
Usually, contracts containing substantively unconscionable terms
exhibit procedural failings as well. 153 Assent to such terms is unlikely
absent some unfairness in the bargaining process. Moreover, it is often
asserted that both procedural unconscionability and substantive uncon-
scionability are necessary for an overall finding of unconscionability
under U.C.C. section 2-302.154 If neither the contract as a whole nor any
of its terms are particularly onerous, that is, why worry about one-sided-
ness in the bargaining process? Also, why should courts concern them-
selves with substantively unconscionable terms where the absence of
procedural defects suggests that each party freely and knowingly as-
sented to those terms? 55 In fact, it has been suggested that "supercon-
scionable" bargaining practices may insulate substantively
unconscionable terms from judicial attack. 5 6 Despite all this, however,
144. "[C]ourts have not been solicitous of businessmen in the name of unconscionability." J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-9, at 170. However, there are situations where contracts
made by business parties in a commercial context will be deemed unconscionable. See id. at 170-73;
Hillman, supra note 1, at 43-44. For more on this subject, see infra notes 250-62 and accompanying
text.
145. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-3, at 153, 154.
146. Id. at 153.
147. E.g., id.; Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 770.
148. E.g., Braucher, supra note 1, at 342; Spanogle, supra note 1, at 963.
149. Also, the seller's knowledge of the buyer's weakness may be a factor. Braucher, supra note
1, at 342; Ellinghaus, supra note i, at 770.
150. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-3, at 154; Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 771.
151. E.g., Spanogle, supra note 1, at 943, 954, 963.
152. E.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-3, at 154. Also, behavior resembling
fraud, duress, and undue influence would no doubt qualify for consideration as well.
153. See id. § 4-7, at 163-64.
154. E.g., id. at 164 (most courts seem to require a certain quantum of procedural unconsciona-
bility and a certain quantum of substantive unconscionability); Spanogle, supra note 1, at 932 (both
forms of unconscionability usually needed).
155. Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 775 (occasions when bargain arrived at by full and free assent
ought to be struck down extremely rare).
156. Noting this possibility are J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-7, at 164-65; El-
linghaus, supra note 1, at 762-63, 773-75; Hillman, supra note 1, at 42-43; Leff II, supra note 1, at
218
UNCONSCIONABILITY AND ARTICLE 2
some observers have argued that certain substantive contract terms may
be sufficiently egregious to provoke a finding of unconscionability in the
absence of procedural unfairness. 5 7 And even where both procedural
and substantive unconscionability are required, overwhelming evidence
of one form of unconscionability may mean that only a token amount of
the other will be necessary.
5 8
II. UNCONSCIONABILITY AND IMPLIED WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS-
THE LAW
The preceding section has set the stage for the main focus of this
article by reviewing the U.C.C.'s implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness, the permissible methods for disclaiming them, and the un-
conscionability doctrine established by U.C.C. section 2-302. This sec-
tion of the article examines situations in which these three bodies of law
are conjoined. Specifically, the section addresses the occasions when a
seller of goods subject to one of Article 2's implied warranties validly
disclaims that warranty and then is confronted by a claim that the dis-
claimer is unconscionable. As will become apparent below, such a claim
will be successful only if the court gives an affirmative answer to each of
two questions: 1) whether section 2-302 can ever apply to implied war-
ranty disclaimers satisfying the tests of U.C.C. section 2-316; and, if so,
2) whether the disclaimer is unconscionable under section 2-302. This
section begins by discussing a series of statutory interpretation arguments
directed to the first of these questions. Then it considers how the existing
case law on the interaction of sections 2-316 and 2-302 deals with each
issue just noted.
A. The Statutory Interpretation Arguments
Most of the arguments for the proposition that U.C.C. section 2-302
should never apply to an implied warranty disclaimer satisfying section
2-316 come from Professor Arthur Allan Left's well-known 1967 article
349-50. The usual examples of procedural superconscionability involve "superdisclosure": for ex-
ample, stating disadvantageous form contract clauses in extremely large or quite contrasting print,
calling such clauses to the consumer's attention, requiring that the consumer read the offending
clause, and/or requiring that the consumer sign separately near the offending clause.
157. E.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-7, at 165 (excessive price alone sufficient
basis for finding contract unconscionable); Braucher, supra note 1, at 339-40 (generally noting the
possibility that substantive unfairness may sometimes be sufficient).
158. "[I]t appears that a contract that is one hundred pounds substantively unconscionable may
require only two pounds of procedural unconscionability to render it unconscionable and vice
versa." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-7, at 165. This may lead some courts to manip-
ulate the facts to find procedural unconscionability where the contract is substantively unfair. Hill-
man, supra note 1, at 22.
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on the unconscionability doctrine. 5 9 The central theme animating many
of Professor Left's arguments was that the specificity of section 2-316's
disclaimer provisions evidences the Code drafters' intent to make it the
sole provision governing implied warranty disclaimers. Although "it
would not have been inconceivable for the draftsmen simply to have de-
clared that some or all of the traditional implied warranties surrounding
sales would be nondisclaimable," he began, "[t]hey did not do so."1
' 6
Instead, he continued, they enacted section 2-316, which "not only says
that warranties may be disclaimed, but.., says how one should go about
doing so, in rather impressive detail and with surprising particularity."'
' 61
Moreover, the comments to section 2-316162 "disclose full awareness of
the problem at hand."' 163 In particular, Comment 1 to section 2-316
states that the section "seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected and
unbargained language of disclaimer by ... permitting the exclusion of
implied warranties only by conspicuous language or other circumstances
which protect the buyer from surprise." Obviously, Leff went on, "the
vice is surprise"'164 and section 2-316(2)'s conspicuousness requirement
was included to prevent surprise from occurring.'
65
The contrary reading of sections 2-316 and 2-302, of course, is that
section 2-316 only states minimum criteria for the enforceability of an
implied warranty disclaimer, and that disclaimers satisfying these criteria
still must be conscionable under section 2-302. By its express terms,
section 2-302 applies to "any clause of the contract." Nothing in that
section or its comments specifically denies its application to contract
clauses that are regulated by other U.C.C. provisions. 166 In fact, one of
section 2-302's comments arguably authorizes the section's application to
implied warranty disclaimers. Comment 1 lists and describes ten pre-
Code cases that presumably were included to illustrate the basis and
scope of the section, and in seven of these cases the court refused to give
full effect to a warranty disclaimer. 67 Moreover, even Comment 1 to
159. See Leff, supra note 1, at 516-28, especially id. at 520-24. A useful summary of most of the
arguments discussed in this section appears in J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 12-11, at
475-77.
160. Leff, supra note 1, at 520. See also id. at 524.
161. Id. at 521. See also id. at 523.
162. See id. at 521 for Lefls statement of the relevant comments.
163. Id. at 523.
164. Id. at 522.
165. See id. (discussing U.C.C. § 1-201(10)'s definition of the term "conspicuous").
166. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 12-11, at 476.
167. Id. There is little need to cite or describe these cases, since the comment provides a capsule
summary of each case, and since it is the drafters' reading of the cases that presumably is determina-
tive here. As Professors White and Summers note, -[i]t is difficult to reconcile an intent on the part
of the draftsmen to immunize disclaimers from the effect of 2-302 with the fact that they used cases
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section 2-316 can be given an interpretation quite contrary to Professor
Left's. Section 2-316's purpose, the comment declares, is "to protect a
buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer." Left's
"plain meaning" reading of the comment suggests that requiring the dis-
claimer to be conspicuous is section 2-316's only permissible means of
advancing this purpose. But inconspicuousness is not the only proce-
dural abuse capable of generating "unbargained" contract terms. In par-
ticular, a disclaimer might be unbargained because a seller with superior
power offers it on a "take it or leave it" basis. 6  Moreover, due to the
infrequency with which implied warranty disclaimers are read and un-
derstood, 169 section 2-316(2)'s conspicuousness requirement is unlikely
to protect buyers from "unexpected" disclaimer language either. Thus,
reading section 2-316 in the light of Comment l's statement of its pur-
pose seems to open the door for further scrutiny of implied warranty
disclaimers under section 2-302.
There are other arguments, however, supporting the Leff position.
As he notes, nine sections of Article 2 contain specific cross-references to
section 2-302, but section 2-316 does not. 170 Still, nothing in section 2-
316 or its comments specifically prohibits section 2-302's application to
implied warranty disclaimers, and section 2-302 has been applied to con-
tract terms regulated by Code provisions that also lack a cross-reference
to section 2-302.171 Despite this, one Article 2 provision containing a
specific textual reference to the possibility of unconscionability-U.C.C.
section 2-719(3)-seems to reinforce Left's general point. 172 Section 2-
719(3), which deals with remedy limitations 73 involving consequential
damages, states that such damages "may be limited or excluded unless
in which courts struck down disclaimers to illustrate the concept of unconscionability." Id. For
Professor Leff's probably-unsuccessful attempt to avoid the force of this argument, see Leff, supra
note 1, at 516, 525-27.
168. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 12-11, at 476-77; Metzger, supra note 5, at
686; Murray, supra note 1, at 48-49; Spanogle, supra note 1, at 956-58.
169. See infra notes 284, 294-99 and accompanying text. Professor Leff, by the way, agreed that
disclaimers are seldom read or understood. E.g., Leff II, supra note 1, at 349.
170. Leff, supra note 1, at 523. The provisions in question are U.C.C. §§ 2-202, 2-204, 2-205, 2-
207, 2-303, 2-508, 2-615, 2-718, and 2-719. The references to which Leff refers are the "Cross Refer-
ences" at the end of each Code section.
171. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 12-11, at 476. Their examples are waiver-of-
defense clauses (permitted, with exceptions, by U.C.C. § 9-206(1)) and cross-security clauses (per-
mitted by U.C.C. § 9-206). See id. nn.200-201.
172. While discussing U.C.C. § 2-719 at length, however, Leff de-emphasized § 2-719(3) and in
fact seemed critical of it. See Leff, supra note 1, at 517-19, especially id. at 519-20 n.130.
173. Remedy limitations, while resembling disclaimers by contractually limiting the buyer's re-
covery, differ in their method of attack. Disclaimers attack particular theories of recovery and, if
successful, prevent the recovery of any damages under the theory in question. Remedy limitations
block the recovery of certain kinds of damages (e.g., consequential damages), but not the theory of
recovery under which they are obtainable. Thus, other kinds of damages may be recoverable under a
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the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequent-
ial damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is
prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is
commercial is not." 174 Here, in a somewhat similar contractual context,
we have the sort of specific reference section 2-316, its comments, or its
cross-references presumably should contain if implied warranty disclaim-
ers are to be subject to section 2-302's unconscionability standards.
Comment 3 to section 2-719 seems to reinforce this point by providing:
"Subsection (3) recognizes the validity of clauses limiting or excluding
consequential damages but makes it clear that they may not operate in an
unconscionable manner .... The seller in all cases is free to disclaim
warranties in the manner provided in Section 2-316."175
This argument against section 2-302's application to implied war-
ranty disclaimers, however, loses force when its implications are laid
bare. A liability disclaimer attacks a particular theory of recovery and, if
valid, eliminates all damage recoveries under that theory. A valid rem-
edy limitation, on the other hand, only blocks the recovery of certain
kinds of damages, leaving the theory of recovery intact and permitting
the recovery of other damages under that theory. Since valid disclaimers
usually would seem more damaging to buyers than valid remedy limita-
tions, one would suppose that the former are better candidates for scru-
tiny under section 2-302. On the reading of section 2-316 advanced in
the preceding paragraph, however, just the reverse is true. Since section
2-719(3) makes the limitation of consequential damages prima facie un-
conscionable in sales of consumer goods, for instance, "a seller who is
barred under subsection 2-719(3) from excluding a buyer's right to re-
cover consequential damages for personal injuries could effectively avoid
the same liability by completely excluding implied warranties via subsec-
tion 2-316(2) or (3)." 176 Considerations of this sort, perhaps, explain the
cases 177 adopting the technically-incorrect 178 approach of invalidating
particular theory of recovery even if the limitation is effective. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 3, § 12-11, at 471-72.
174. On the operation of this section, see id. at 472-75.
175. U.C.C. § 2-316(4) also seems to reinforce the argument that §§ 2-316 and 2-719(3) are
distinct provisions treating different kinds of contract clauses under different standards. It provides:
"Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the provisions of this Article on
liquidation or limitation of damages and on contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and
2-719)." In addition, id. § 2-316, Comment 2 states that: "This Article treats the limitation or
avoidance of consequential damages as a matter of limiting remedies for breach, separate from the
matter of creation of liability under a warranty .... Under subsection (4) the question of limitation
of remedy is governed by the sections referred to rather than by this section."
176. Metzger, supra note 5, at 685. See also Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories
and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974, 995 (1966).
177. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 889-90, 430 S.W.2d 778, 781-82 (1968).
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implied warranty disclaimers under section 2-719(3) where a consumer
has suffered personal injury.
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B. The Cases
All things considered, the statutory construction arguments dis-
cussed above tend to support U.C.C. section 2-302's application to im-
plied warranty disclaimers. But they are not the last word on the subject.
Since prior judicial interpretations of statutes are often said to bind sub-
sequent courts deciding like issues,180 it is necessary to examine the ex-
tant case law discussing the unconscionability doctrine's application in
implied warranty cases. As will become apparent, the thirty-five-odd de-
cisions dealing more or less directly with this issue'81 are a heterogeneous
178. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 12-12, at 484-85.
179. "Undoubtedly the main reason why courts refuse to follow the literal scheme of the Code is
its harshness. If neither 2-302 nor 2-719(3) operate as restrictions on disclaimers drafted pursuant to
2-316, then the seller may have the power to thrust on the consumer all risks of personal injury
resulting from defects in its products." Id. at 485. Of course, this would not be true where a negli-
gence or § 402A claim can be mounted, but we are not presently concerned with these possibilities.
180. See E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 32 (paperback ed. 1949) (stating
apparently unqualified rule that prior interpretations should be followed); 2A D. SANDS, SUTHER-
LAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 49.03-49.10 (1972) (stating the many factors
relevant to determining the binding effect of prior interpretations).
181. The relevant cases are: Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 315 (6th Cir.
1985); FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1980); Feeders, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,
33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 541 (D. Minn. 1981); Tacoma Boatbuilding Co. v. Delta Fish-
ing Co., 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 26 (W.D. Wash. 1980); Badger Bearing Co. v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1977); U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358
F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich. 1972), afl'd, 509 F.2d 1403 (6th Cir. 1975); Salt River Project Agric.
Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 143 Ariz. 368, 694 P.2d 198 (1984);
Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 130 Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210 (1981); Ford Motor Co. v.
Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778 (1968) (using U.C.C. § 2-719(3) to invalidate disclaimer); A &
M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982); Salcetti v. Tuck, 27
U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 679 (D.C. Super Ct. 1979); Monsanto Agric. Prods. Co. v. Eden-
field, 35 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 781 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson
Plumbing Co., 132 Ga. App. 435, 208 S.E.2d 321 (1974); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Chapman,
129 Ga. App. 830, 201 S.E.2d 686 (1973); Avery v. Aladdin Prods. Div., Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 128
Ga. App. 266, 196 S.E.2d 357 (1973); Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462,
188 S.E.2d 250 (1972); Earl M. Jorgensen v. Mark Constr., Inc., 56 Hawaii 466, 540 P.2d 978
(1975); Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943 (Ind. App. 1982); Dillman & Assoc., Inc. v.
Capitol Leasing Co., 110 Ill. App. 3d 335, 442 N.E.2d 311 (1982); Beneficial Commercial Corp. v.
Cottrell, 688 P.2d 1254 (Mont. 1984); R.D. Lowrance, Inc. v. Peterson, 185 Neb. 679, 178 N.W.2d
277 (1970); Bill Stremmel Motors, Inc. v. IDS Leasing Corp., 89 Nev. 414, 514 P.2d 654 (1973);
Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968) (only tangential reliance
on § 2-302); Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enters., Inc., 58 A.D.2d
482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1977); Sarfati v. M.A. Hittner & Sons, 35 A.D.2d 1004, 318 N.Y.S.2d 352
(1971); Architectual Aluminum Corp. v. Macarr, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 495, 333 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1972);
Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1969); Walsh v. Ford Motor
Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1969); Electronics Corp. of America v. Lear Jet Corp., 55
Misc. 2d 1066, 286 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1967); Konicki v. Salvaco, Inc., 16 Ohio App. 3d 40, 474 N.E.2d
347 (1984); Evans v. Graham Ford, Inc., 2 Ohio App. 3d 435, 442 N.E.2d 777 (1981); Eckstein v.
Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897 (1974); Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 315 N.W.2d
696 (S.D. 1982); Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870
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lot. This section will begin with an attempt at classifying these cases.
Then it will consider their position on the question discussed above:
whether section 2-302 can ever be used to invalidate an implied warranty
disclaimer satisfying the tests set by U.C.C. section 2-316. After con-
cluding that the vast majority of courts have answered this question in
the affirmative, the section will conclude by examining the various fac-
tors that are relevant for determining the conscionability or unconsciona-
bility of particular disclaimers.
1. Classifying the Cases
Before examining their treatment of legal questions, it might be use-
ful to attempt a rough classification of the cases discussing the unconscio-
nability of implied warranty disclaimers. Quite apart from the legal
significance of such a categorization, one issue is182 what kinds of cases
do we have here? Obviously, all the relevant decisions involve implied
warranty disclaimers,18 3 and these disclaimers invariably are in writ-
ing.184 In addition, most such disclaimers seem to be contained in con-
tracts or other writings that were used with sufficient frequency and
consistency to qualify as standard forms. 185 A few, however, may have
been tailored to the requirements of a particular sale, or have been the
product of explicit bargaining. '8 6 Also, some of the disclaimers found in
the cases were read by the buyer before the sale.'8 7 In the typical case,
(1974); Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile, Inc., 207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140 (1967) (pre-Code case);
Rottinghaus v. Howell, 35 Wash. App. 99, 666 P.2d 899 (1983); Butcher v. Garrett-Enumclaw Co.,
20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (1978). Cf Oddo v. General Motors Corp., 22 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 1147 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (not discussing a specific disclaimer but invalidating
a manufacturer's warranty on unconscionability grounds). Throughout the remainder of this sec-
tion, short forms will be used for the citation of these cases.
182. Of course, as will become apparent in the pages ahead, the classifications used here do have
considerable legal significance.
183. However, Oddo, 22 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1147, may be an exception. There, the Court held
that it was unconscionable to limit the plaintiff to the recovery obtainable under the manufacturer's
express warranty. Id. at 1148-49. But it is not clear from the case whether or not a disclaimer
existed.
184. However, cf Salcetti, 27 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 683 (disclaimer on sales receipt signed by
plaintiff).
185. See, e.g., Feeders, 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 542-43 (disclaimer on cans of Lasso herbicide);
Salt River, 143 Ariz. at 373, 694 P.2d at 203 (disclaimer in document described as "standardized
acceptance form"); Seekings, 130 Ariz. at 601-02, 638 P.2d at 215-16 (disclaimer appearing on
purchase order and purchase money security agreement in sale of mobile home to consumers); Dill-
man, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 336, 442 N.E.2d at 313 (lease on which disclaimer appears called "form
contract").
186. Possible examples include Murphree, 632 F.2d at 420 (contract that was product of exten-
sive negotiation); U.S. Fibres, 358 F. Supp. at 460 (both parties realized that purpose of contract to
allocate risks associated with transaction in question). Of course, neither factor is likely to be pres-
ent in the typical consumer case.
187. E.g., Badger, 444 F. Supp. at 921. Cf Hahn, 434 N.E.2d at 949-50 (buyer generally aware
of 12,000 mile/12 month warranty limitation in sale of car); Macarr, 70 Misc. 2d at 500, 333
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however, it is doubtful whether the disclaimer was read or specifically
bargained for.
188
Slightly over half of the relevant decisions involve business buyers
operating in a more or less commercial context. Some of these parties,
however, are difficult to distinguish from ordinary consumers. 1 89 Within
this general business/commercial classification, the fact patterns vary
considerably. A few of these cases involve large, sophisticated corporate
entities dealing with each other on a relatively equal footing. °90 Rather
more common, however, is the purchase of a large corporation's prod-
ucts by a small-to-medium-sized firm.'91 Also fairly common is the situ-
ation where two businesses of small-to-medium-size confront one
another. 192 Although the courts are often quite imprecise in describing
the damages claimed by the plaintiff, most of the commercial cases in-
volve business buyers that are seeking to recover economic losses
193 of
various sorts. 194 In a few of these cases, however, the validity of the
N.Y.S.2d at 823-24 (disclaimers long used in similar past transactions between seller and buyer are
common in industry).
188. Sometimes, courts make specific statements on the point. E.g., Murphree, 632 F.2d at 419
(buyer did not actually read lease); A & M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124
(buyer testified that he never read reverse side of form where disclaimer appeared); Rottinghaus, 35
Wash. App. at 104, 666 P.2d at 903 (no discussions, bargaining, negotiations, or actual agreement
regarding disclaimer clause). More often, however, the absence of knowledge or negotiations can be
fairly easily inferred even though the court says nothing specific on the subject. See, e.g., Feeders, 33
U.C.C. REP. SERv. 541 (sale of Lasso herbicide to farmer; standard disclaimer on can); Seekings,
130 Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210 (sale of mobile home to consumers; disclaimer on purchase order and
purchase money security agreement; disclaimer obviously not negotiated and perhaps not read).
189. See, e.g., Martin, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 320 n.4 (court uncertain whether plaintiff farm-
ers U.C.C. "merchants," but deciding to operate on assumption that case "commercial" in nature);
Wilson Plumbing, 132 Ga. App. 435, 208 S.E.2d 686 (plumbing company with one stockholder
purchasing car from local dealer); Sarfati, 35 A.D.2d at 1005, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 354 (lessor whose
business not identified in case "in no better commercial position than the consumer" regarding lease
of car).
190. E.g., Salt River, 143 Ariz. 368, 694 P.2d 198 (large electric utility company and Westing-
house Electric Corporation).
191. E.g., Murphree, 632 F.2d 413 (closely held corporation running shuttle service and leasing
subsidiary of FMC Finance Corporation); Feeders, 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 541 (corporation engaged
in farming and cattle feeding versus Monsanto Company); Badger, 444 F. Supp. 919 (corporation
engaged in distributing bearings and power transmission components versus Burroughs Corpora-
tion); A & M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (solely owned farming corporation and
FMC Corporation); Edenfield, 35 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 781 (knowledgeable and experienced farmer
versus Monsanto).
192. E.g., Dillman, 110 I11. App. 3d 355, 442 N.E.2d 311 (firm in business of preparing tax
returns and lessor of copier); Bill Stremmel, 89 Nev. 414, 514 P.2d 654 (auto dealer and lessor of
communications system); Butcher, 20 Wash. App. 2d 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (sawmill operator and firm
about to go into mass production of portable small log sawmill).
193. By "economic losses," I mean basis of the bargain damages, property damage, and indirect
economic loss. See supra notes 47, 49-50 and accompanying text.
194. E.g., Feeders, 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 542 (crop loss); Badger, 444 F. Supp. at 922 (losses
resulting from defective computer system); Salt River, 143 Ariz. at 374, 694 P.2d at 204 (damage to
gas turbine unit and any resulting losses; personal injury not mentioned); A & M Produce, 135 Cal.
App. 3d at 479-80, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117-18 (damage to tomato crop and any resulting losses).
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disclaimer is at issue because the buyer has employed the seller's alleged
breach of warranty as a defense to the seller's suit for the purchase
price.
195
The remaining cases involve purchases by consumers. Here, the de-
cisions are more homogeneous, 196 being fairly evenly divided between
contests against small-to-medium-sized sellers197 and clashes with corpo-
rate "giants."' 98 With a few exceptions, 99 there do not appear to be
substantial variations within the generally low range of business sophisti-
cation possessed by the consumers in question. One significant basis for
classifying the consumer cases, however, is the damages at issue in these
decisions. 2°° Some of the consumer cases are suits for personal injury, 20
while others only involve some kind of economic loss. 202 In addition, as
with the commercial cases, a few of the consumer decisions present situa-
tions where the seller sues for the price and the buyer employs the seller's
alleged breach of warranty as a defense.
20 3
2. The Applicability of Section 2-302 to Otherwise Valid Implied
Warranty Disclaimers
The taxonomy contained in the preceding section ignored one sali-
ent feature of the cases considering the issues whether and when implied
warranty disclaimers can be judged unconscionable. The feature com-
195. E.g., Murphree, 632 F.2d at 417 (party sued as guarantor on lease alleged breach of war-
ranty as defense and also asserted unconscionability of warranty disclaimer); Avery, 128 Ga. App.
266, 196 S.E.2d 357 (seller's suit for purchase price).
196. Many of these cases involve automobiles. See Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778; Jacobs,
125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250; Hahn, 434 N.E.2d 943; Zabriskie, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d
195; Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390; Walsh, 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538;
Evans, 2 Ohio App. 3d 435, 442 N.E.2d 777; Eckstein, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897; Moulton,
511 S.W.2d 690; Marshall, 207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 172.
197. See, e.g., Seekings, 130 Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210 (Tuscon dealer in motor homes); Salcetti, 27
U.C.C. REP. SERV. 679 (pet shop); Zabriskie, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (auto dealer); Mar-
cano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (used car dealer and finance company).
198. See, e.g., Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778 (Ford); Walsh, 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d
538 (Ford); Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690 (Ford). Cf Jacobs, 125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250 (auto
dealer and Chrysler).
199. Possible exceptions, however, include Salcetti, 27 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 683 (plaintiffs not
unsophisticated consumers, since they negotiated 30-day extension of right to return dog to pet shop
for cash credit if dog became seriously ill); and, at the other extreme, Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d at 141,
302 N.Y.S.2d at 393-94 (plaintiff virtually unable to understand English).
200. The presence of personal injury is probably a significant (if unavowed) basis for decision in
cases where a disclaimer is challenged on grounds of unconscionability. See infra note 239 and
accompanying text.
201. Eg.. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778; Walsh, 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538;
Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690.
202. See, e.g., Salcetti, 27 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 681 (cost of puppy and medical and transporta-
tion expenses for treatment of puppy); Evans, 2 Ohio App. 3d 435, 442 N.E.2d 777 (truck's unsuita-
bility for intended purposes).
203. Eg., Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390.
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mon to all these cases is the generally low quality of their technical legal
argumentation. 204 Nowhere is this more evident than in the way these
cases treat the basic question whether U.C.C. section 2-302 can have any
application to disclaimers that have satisfied the tests of section 2-316.
As we have seen, this question involves significant issues of statutory con-
struction. And it is plainly distinguishable from a further question that
arises once it has been decided that section 2-302 can apply: whether the
disclaimer will survive the resulting scrutiny under section 2-302.205
Despite the inadequate way they deal with the issue, the relevant
decisions overwhelmingly support the proposition that implied warranty
disclaimers satisfying section 2-316 may still be examined under section
2-302.206 Only a few of these cases, however, analyze the question in any
depth. 20 7 By far the more common tendency is for the court to simply
assume that section 2-302 applies, and then to discuss the various factors
relevant to unconscionability determinations. 208 Also, the few cases re-
204. The exceptions to this generalization include Martin, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 318-23;
Murphree, 632 F.2d at 420; Tacoma Boatbuilding, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 30-45; and A & M
Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 483-93, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 119-28.
205. The fact that these questions are distinguishable is obvious when we consider cases that
clearly allow § 2-302 to apply to disclaimers that satisfy § 2-316, but then refuse to find the dis-
claimer unconscionable under the circumstances. To take just one example, the court in Murphree,
632 F.2d at 420, concluded that "section 2-302 could apply to a warranty disclaimer meeting tve
requirements of section 2-316," but then proceeded to hold that the disclaimer was valid nonetheless.
Of course, if a court decides that § 2-302 can have no application to a disclaimer satisfying § 2-316,
it need not consider the second question.
206. Of the cases cited in supra note 181, the only decisions reaching the opposite conclusion are
Chapman, 129 Ga. App. at 831, 201 S.E.2d at 187-88; Avery, 128 Ga. App. at 267, 196 S.E.2d at 358;
R.D. Lowrance, 185 Neb. at 682-83, 178 N.W.2d at 279; Moulton, 511 S.W.2d at 693-94. Cf Mar-
shall, 207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140 (decided before enactment of the UCC). See infra note 209 for a
discussion of these cases. Also, cf Koehring v. A.P.I., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 882, 891 (E.D. Mich. 1974)
(equivocal on question whether 2-302 might apply to disclaimers in general, but disclaimer certainly
not unconscionable on facts of case); Curtis v. Fordham Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 364 N.Y.S.2d 767,
770 81 Misc. 2d 566, 568 (Civ. Ct. 1975) (ambivalent about possibility that implied warrantly dis-
claimers might be unconscionable).
207. Only five of the cases even mention the issues raised in supra notes 159-79 and accompany-
ing text. See Martin, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 319; Murphree, 632 F.2d at 420; Tacoma Boatbuild-
ing, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 34-35; A & M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 483-85, 186 Cal. Rptr. at
120; Hahn, 434 N.E.2d at 951-52.
208. See Feeders 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 543-44; Badger, 444 F. Supp. at 923; U.S. Fibres, 358
F. Supp. at 459-60; Salt River, 143 Ariz. at 374, 694 P.2d at 204-05; Seekings, 130 Ariz. at 602, 638
P.2d at 216-17; Salcetti, 27 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 683-84; Monsanto, 35 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 784-
86 (unclear whether discussion applies to remedy limitation, disclaimer, or both); Wilson Plumbing,
132 Ga. App. at 439-40, 208 S.E.2d at 324-25; Jacobs, 125 Ga. App. at 465-67, 188 S.E.2d at 253-54;
Dillman, 110 111. App. 3d at 341-43, 442 N.E.2d at 316-17; Cottrell, 688 P.2d at 1257; Bill Stremmel,
89 Nev. at 418, 514 P.2d at 657; Industralease, 58 A.D.2d at 488-90, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 430-32;
Sarfati, 35 A.D.2d at 1005, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 354; Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d at 140-42, 302 N.Y.S.2d at
393-95; Lear Jet, 55 Misc. 2d at 1068, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 713; Evans, 2 Ohio App. 3d at 438, 442
N.E.2d at 780-81; Eckstein, 41 Ohio App. 2d at 9-11, 321 N.E.2d at 903-04; Durham, 315 N.W.2d at
700-01 (discussion apparently applying to both disclaimer and warranty limitation); Rottinghaus, 35
Wash. App. at 104, 666 P.2d at 903; Butcher, 20 Wash. App. at 367, 581 P.2d at 1357-59. See also
Tritt, 244 Ark. at 889-90, 430 S.W.2d at 781-82 (finding implied warranty disclaimer unconscionable
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jecting section 2-302's application to otherwise valid implied warranty
disclaimers are equally casual in their discussion of the issue. 20 9 Only
one of them,210 in fact, cites the primary source of arguments supporting
their position: Professor Left's well-known 1967 article.
211
3. The Unconscionability Determination
In General. In slightly over half of the cases applying U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-302 to implied warranty disclaimers, the court ultimately found
the disclaimer conscionable and enforced it. The reasons for these
courts' determinations are rooted in the facts before them and thus vary
from case to case. The same is true for the decisions finding the dis-
claimer unconscionable. Regardless of their final position on the uncon-
scionability question, moreover, many of the cases employ a rather
perfunctory legal analysis to reach it.
Few of the courts, for instance, make any reference to the proce-
dural/substantive analysis discussed earlier,212 or, indeed, to any other
discernible mode of unconscionability analysis. Instead, the typical deci-
sion merely states section 2-302 and then gives a few reasons why the
disclaimer in question is or is not unconscionable. For example, in Feed-
ers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,2t3 where a farmer sued for crop losses caused
by a defective 900-gallon purchase of Lasso herbicide, the court managed
to compress its reasons for denying the plaintiff's unconscionability claim
and enforcing the manufacturer's disclaimer into one paragraph. This
paragraph contained the following arguments: 1) that the disclaimer was
under U.C.C. § 2-719(3)). Cf. Macarr, 70 Misc. 2d at 499, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 823; Walsh, 59 Misc. 2d
at 242-43, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 539-40 (unclear whether disclaimer's unconscionability based on § 2-302
or § 2-719(3)). On the technical incorrectness of using § 2-719(3) to invalidate implied warranty
disclaimers, see supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
209. In Avery, 128 Ga. App. at 267, 196 S.E.2d at 358, the court concluded that the disclaimer
satisfied U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a), and that § 2-302 was inapplicable because "[t]he provisions of the
contract contended . . . to be unconscionable under [§ 2-302] are provisions which the law itself
specifically permits." Chapman, 129 Ga. App. at 831, 201 S.E.2d at 687-88, simply followed Avery.
The court in R.D. Lowrance, 185 Neb. at 682-83, 178 N.W.2d at 279, apparently employed similar
reasoning, simply stating that the implied warranty was excluded by usage of trade under § 2-
316(3)(c). The court in Moulton, 511 S.W.2d at 694, merely declared that '[m]ost commentaries
answer this question in the negative." However, the analysis in Marshall, 207 Va. at 976-79, 154
S.E.2d at 143-45, was more extensive, but Marshall was decided before enactment of the UCC. For
a discussion of this case, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 12-11, at 478-79.
210. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d at 694.
211. Leff, supra note 1.
212. The only cases employing this kind of analysis are Tacoma Boatbuilding, 28 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. at 34-45; A & M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 485-93, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122-26; Hahn, 434
N.E.2d at 951-52. Cf Martin, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 321 (mentioning procedural unconscionabil-
ity); Industralease, 58 A.D.2d at 489, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 431 (recognizing the distinction but not apply-
ing it).
213. 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 541, 544.
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conspicuous; 2) that it would be read by a reasonable farmer; 3) that the
plaintiff was a large farming corporation, not a consumer; and 4) that the
disclaimer did not exclude all liability because an express warranty was
present.
Just as they tend to ignore the procedural/substantive distinction,
the courts generally do not explicitly consider when or whether either
form of unconscionability might itself be sufficient for an overall determi-
nation of unconscionability. 214 On the whole, the cases emphasize proce-
dural concerns. The reasons for this emphasis are not difficult to
understand. Ordinarily, the only substantive factor present in these deci-
sions is the implied warranty disclaimer itself.215 The substantive effect
of such a clause is obvious: it blocks recovery under the excluded im-
plied warranty. Admittedly, there may be problems determining how
much or what kind of harm the denial of recovery must cause before the
disclaimer will be a serious substantive concern. 216 Generally, though,
the courts are dealing with a discrete contract clause with more or less
identifiable effects. Thus, there are inherent limits on the scope of any
substantive inquiry they might desire to make.
Another reason why the courts tend to emphasize procedural fac-
tors is the unlikelihood that the mere presence of a disclaimer is enough
to produce an overall finding of unconscionability. Presumptively, a dis-
claimer is a legitimate device for allocating the risks associated with a
sale of goods. Thus, it is difficult to argue that disclaimers should be
invalidated where no procedural defects impair a party's free and know-
ing assent to their terms. Further weighing against the position that im-
plied warranty disclaimers are so substantively objectionable that they
should be struck down in the absence of procedural unfairness is the ob-
vious fact that U.C.C. section 2-316 sanctions their use.217 For these
214. The only specific statement on this subject is found in Tacoma Boatbuilding, 28 U.C.C.
REP. SERV. at 34 (risk allocation devices not unconscionable unless procedurally unfair, at least in
commercial cases).
215. Implied warranty disclaimers are routinely put under the "substantive unconscionability"
heading. E.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-6 at 160.
216. Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 796 suggests that an implied warranty disclaimer should be
deemed unconscionable if it is: 1) at odds with the "iron essence" of a transaction for the sale of
goods; or 2) an alteration or evisceration of the bargained terms in a contract for the sale of goods.
The first category seems to involve goods that differ drastically from the contract description or are
radically defective. Id. at 798-99. The second seems mainly to apply to breaches of the implied
warranty of fitness. See id. at 801. Also, it has been suggested that the presence of personal injury
may be a covert factor in some unconscionability cases. See Leff II, supra note 1, at 354 n.20. See
also infra note 239 and accompanying text.
217. Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 793 (implied warranty disclaimers not unconscionable in them-
selves because § 2-316 explicitly legitimizes them).
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reasons, procedural concerns are usually decisive in determining the un-
conscionability of a particular disclaimer.
The few implied warranty disclaimer cases raising substantive con-
cerns, however, depart from this suggested pattern. In one of them, the
substantive effect of the implied warranty disclaimer appeared to be the
sole factor leading the court to declare a disclaimer unconscionable.
Eckstein v. Cummins218 involved a consumer's purchase of an automo-
bile that, despite the dealer's extensive efforts at repair, continued to hum
and vibrate when it reached speeds of 35 to 40 miles per hour. Even
though the car was covered by an express warranty for the repair or
replacement of defective parts, the court found an accompanying implied
warranty disclaimer unconscionable. However, it only did so because the
express warranty did not adequately protect the buyer's contractual ex-
pectations in the unusual fact situation it confronted. The court stated:
To place the purchaser of a defective vehicle incapable of repair in
the anomalous position of having no actionable claim for relief pursu-
ant to the strict language of the express warranty and disclaimer
therein, because the precise nature of the defect cannot be determined
and the plaintiff cannot identify any defective part the replacement of
which could remedy the defect, would be to defeat the very purpose of
the warranty which had been given to the purchaser. Such a result
would substantially deprive the buyer of the benefit of his bargain and
is unconscionable. Although the warranty and disclaimer, which is
strictly limited to parts, is not unconscionable on its face, it cannot be
applied to the facts of this case in a conscionable manner.
219
In the remaining cases considering substantive factors, the substantive
element was only one component in a decision-making process that in-
volved procedural elements as well. In these cases, the substantive con-
cern troubling the court was that enforcing the disclaimer either left the
buyer without an effective remedy 220 or made the deal extremely one-
sided. 22
1
As noted, most of the implied warranty disclaimer/unconscionabil-
ity cases only discuss procedural concerns. In general, they appear to
take the view that the presence of an implied warranty disclaimer is a
218. 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897 (1974).
219. Id. at 10-11, 321 N.E.2d at 904.
220. SeeA & MProduce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125; Durham, 315 N.W.2d
at 700. Cf Feeders, 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 544 (fact that implied warranty disclaimer does not
exclude all liability a factor in conclusion that it is not unconscionable).
221. Industralease, 58 A.D.2d at 490, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 432 (fact that purchased equipment did
not work at all and that deal thus one-sided one factor in finding of unconscionability). Cf. Martin,
41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 322-23 (balancing impact of disclaimer on buyers against burden on seller
to correct defect); Marcano, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 393 (dollar analysis of relative benefits obtained by each
party to consumer transaction one factor in unconscionability finding).
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matter of some substantive significance, but that its unconscionability de-
pends on the existence of sufficient procedural defects. The most com-
mon procedural factors considered by these courts are such familiar
matters as relative bargaining power,222 the characteristics of the par-
ties,223 the presence or absence of negotiations, 224 and the buyer's knowl-
edge of the disclaimer's existence. 225 Even though U.C.C. section 2-316
hardly neglects the subject, some courts consider the disclaimer's con-
spicuousness as well. 226 Less frequently considered are factors such as
the existence of seller competition on warranties, 227 the complexity of the
disclaimer's language, 228 the parties' past dealings and customs in the
trade,229 and the presence of "sales hype."'230 Occasionally, the courts
seem to disagree about the weight to be given individual factors. For
example, apparent differences of opinion on the importance of bargaining
power, 231 negotiations, 232 and actual buyer knowledge233 are not
infrequent.
Of the procedural factors just noted, the most important is the na-
222. Eg., Martin, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 321 (bargaining power one factor considered); A &
MProduce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125 (same); Cottrell, 688 P.2d at 1257 (same).
223. E.g., Feeders, 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 544 (fact that plaintiff a large farming corporation,
not a consumer, a factor in rejecting unconscionability claim); Salcetti, 27 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 683
(consumer plaintiffs not unsophisticated consumers).
224. Eg., Murphree, 632 F.2d at 420 (extensive negotiations a factor in finding disclaimer con-
scionable); Sarfati, 35 A.D.2d at 1005, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 354 (inability to negotiate terms crucial to
unconscionability of disclaimer).
225. E.g., Martin, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERv. at 322 (salesman's failure to inform buyers about effect
of disclaimer a factor in finding of unconscionability); U.S. Fibres, 358 F. Supp. at 460 (knowledge
that purpose of contract to allocate risks seemingly crucial in upholding disclaimer); Marcano, 60
Misc. 2d at 141, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 393-94 (buyer's inability to understand English a major factor
making disclaimer unconscionable).
226. E.g., Feeders, 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 544; Dillman, 110 11. App. 3d at 343, 442 N.E.2d at
317.
227. Martin, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 321; Murphree, 632 F.2d at 420.
228. A & M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
229. Macarr, 70 Misc. 2d at 500, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 823-24.
230. Salcetti, 27 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 683 (absence of "forceful sales talk" a factor in rejection
of unconscionability claim).
231. Compare, e.g., Murphree, 632 F.2d at 420 (absence of grossly disproportionate bargaining
power a significant factor behind finding of conscionability in commercial context) with US. Fibres,
358 F. Supp. at 460 (superior bargaining power irrelevant in similar context if both parties realize
that purpose of contract to allocate risks). Cf Martin, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 321 (noting the
disagreement and concluding that bargaining power is relevant).
232. Compare, e.g., Murphree, 632 F.2d at 420 (extensive negotiations a significant factor behind
finding of conscionability in commercial transaction) with Tacoma Boatbuilding, 27 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. at 38 (specific negotiations not essential to conscionability where sophisticated parties con-
tract in commercial context).
233. Compare, e.g., A & MProduce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25 (business
buyer's lack of actual knowledge seemingly an important element in finding of unconscionability)
with Tacoma Boatbuilding, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 37-38 (crucial issue in determining procedural
unconscionability whether actual or constructive knowledge present; no requirement that buyer actu-
ally read contract).
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ture of the parties: specifically, the distinction between sales to consum-
ers and commercial sales to business actors. This distinction is often
important for unconscionability determinations generally, 234 and it
figures prominently in the next section of this article. In order to flesh
out the present discussion, therefore, I will now consider each of these
situations in relative detail.
The Consumer Cases. Despite the influence of well-known cases like
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,235 courts do not invariably find
disclaimers unconscionable in consumer cases. Of the twelve-odd con-
sumer cases applying U.C.C. section 2-302 to an implied warranty dis-
claimer, about half have found the disclaimer unconscionable 236 and half
have not. These cases diverge widely in their handling of the unconscio-
nability question, and sometimes their reasoning appears muddled or
confusing. 237 Although their consumer context injects a sizeable dose of
procedural unconscionability into the determination, the cases generally
emphasize substantive factors to a greater extent than the "commercial"
cases. Although this is usually not discussed openly, 238 the substantive
factor with the most predictive value in consumer cases is the presence of
personal injury. In such cases, the courts invariably find the disclaimer
unconscionable. 2
39
234. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
235. 32 N.J. 358, 385-406, 161 A.2d 69, 87-96 (1960) (holding automobile manufacturer's stan-
dard form disclaimer invalid on grounds of public policy).
236. In making this tally, I am including Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778 (which used
U.C.C. § 2-719(3) to invalidate an implied warranty disclaimer) and Walsh, 59 Misc. 2d at 242-43,
298 N.Y.S.2d at 539-40 (which may have done the same).
237. In Hahn, 434 N.E.2d at 950-52, the court undertook a fairly lengthy discussion of uncon-
scionability doctrine, and then concluded, without any explanation, that the manufacturer's dis-
claimer was not so one-sided as to be unconscionable as a matter of law. See id. at 952. In a later
portion of its opinion dealing with the dealer's disclaimer, however, the court considered such rou-
tine factors as the absence of fraud, the disclaimer's conspicuousness, and the understanding reason-
ably to be attributed to a buyer of ordinary sophistication before finding the disclaimer conscionable.
Id. at 953. In Walsh, 59 Misc. 2d at 242-43, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 539-40, the court may have been
directly employing § 2-302 to find the disclaimer unconscionable, may have been using § 2-719(3) to
do so, or may have utilized the two in tandem. See also Zabriskie, 99 N.J. Super. at 446-50, 240
A.2d at 198-200 (blurring together unconscionability, § 2-316(2)'s conspicuousness tests, the Hen-
ningsen rationale, and perhaps failure of essential purpose under U.C.C. § 2-719(2)); Evans, 2 Ohio
App. 3d at 438, 442 N.E.2d at 781 (considering a variety of factors not ordinarily employed in
unconscionability cases). See also infra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
238. However, see infra text accompanying note 240.
239. See Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778 (using U.C.C. § 2-719(3)); Walsh, 59 Misc. 2d 241,
298 N.Y.S.2d 538. Cf. Sarfati, 35 A.D.2d 1004, 318 N.Y.S.2d 352 (technically a "commercial" case
involving personal injury, but a case where the business plaintiff resembled a consumer). In
Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690, the court upheld a disclaimer in the consumer/personal injury context,
but did so on the basis that §§ 2-302 and 2-719(3) have no application to implied warranty disclaim-
ers. See id. at 692-94. The overall results in these cases, of course, correspond to those that would
occur under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), where disclaimers are virtually
never effective in consumer cases. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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The substantive factors openly considered by the courts in consumer
cases are generally similar to those noted above: the disclaimer's capac-
ity to leave the buyer without an effective remedy or to make the deal
extremely one-sided. To illustrate how these factors might affect a
court's decision, consider the following statement by a Georgia interme-
diate appellate court:
There is obviously a point at which the warranty limitation must be
considered unconscionable-for example if, due to defective manufac-
ture or failure to repair by failing to place a 25 cent nut on the proper
bolt, the brakes fail and a collision occurs resulting in heavy property
damage and personal injury, courts might well be loathe to limit the
manufacturer's or seller's liability to the sum of twenty-five cents.
24°
Also, as mentioned previously,241 one court seemingly has held a dis-
claimer unconscionable without the presence of procedural defects be-
cause it would have deprived the buyer of any effective remedy under the
special facts of the case. Sometimes, however, a substantive analysis
leads the court to the conclusion that the disclaimer is conscionable. In
Seekings v. Jimmy GMC, 242 the Arizona Supreme Court upheld a dis-
claimer despite the buyers' inferior bargaining position because "[t]here
is no evidence that the disclaimer Jimmy GMC used in [the buyers'] con-
tract was different than the disclaimer Jimmy GMC used in all its sales
contracts. '2
43
In the Seekings case, the court blended its substantive conclusion
with some procedural analysis. From the disclaimer's similarity to previ-
ous disclaimers, it reasoned that the seller did not use its superior bar-
gaining position to oppress or unfairly surprise the buyers, concluding
that "this allocation of risks should not be disturbed in the absence of
overreaching by the party with superior bargaining power."'2 "4 The other
consumer cases considering procedural factors tend to focus on matters
other than bargaining power as such. In one decision involving the sale
of a diseased puppy, the court emphasized the disclaimer's supposed con-
spicuousness, the buyer's asserted business sophistication, and the ab-
sence of sales talk in finding the disclaimer conscionable.2 45 In another
240. Jacobs, 125 Ga. App. at 466, 188 S.E.2d at 253 (dictum).
241. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
242. 130 Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210 (1981).
243. Id. at 602, 638 P.2d at 216. Of course this begs an obvious question: whether the earlier
disclaimers were unconscionable.
244. Id.
245. Salcetti, 27 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 683-84. In that case, the "conspicuous" disclaimer was
printed in dark type on the front of a sales receipt. The court emphasized that it was not in fine print
and was not buried amidst other boilerplate clauses. Also, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
were not unschooled, unsophisticated consumers because they negotiated a 30-day extension of their
right to return the puppy for a cash credit if it turned out to be seriously ill.
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case yielding the same result, the relevant factors were the absence of
fraud, the disclaimer's conspicuousness, and the court's judgment re-
garding the knowledge and sophistication attributable to an ordinary
consumer. 246 However, in the much-cited case of Zabriskie Chevrolet,
Inc. v. Smith,247 where the court struck down a disclaimer accompanying
the sale of a sadly defective new car, the court seemingly based its uncon-
scionability finding on the dealer's failure to bring the disclaimer to the
buyer's attention and explain it, the disclaimer's inconspicuousness, and
the fact that the buyer only received the disclaimer after the sale. Fi-
nally, in the equally well-known case of Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Mar-
cano,248 a major reason for the court's unconscionability finding was the
buyer's inability to understand English.
24 9
The Commercial Cases. As Professors White and Summers declare,
"courts have not been solicitous of businessmen in the name of uncon-
scionability. ' 2 50 This generalization seems at least somewhat accurate in
the present context, where roughly two-thirds of the courts applying sec-
tion 2-302 to an implied warranty disclaimer find the disclaimer conscio-
nable. Some of these courts expressly make the general "business/
commercial" label a factor in their decisions. 25 1 Since business actors
generally possess the size, sophistication, expertise, and bargaining power
lacking in consumers, 252 this reliance would seem justified at first blush.
Thus, it appears that procedural concerns of this sort are often the deter-
246. See the discussion of the Hahn case in supra note 237.
247. 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
248. Id. at 447-50, 240 A.2d at 198-200. Most of these factors, however, seem capable of being
subsumed under § 2-316, thus removing the need to consider unconscionability at all. For the wide
range of doctrines apparently justifying the court's decision, see supra note 237.
249. 60 Misc. 2d at 141, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 393-94. The court treated the plaintiffs language
deficiency as a factor giving the seller superior bargaining power. Id. at 140, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
Also, its opinion considered a substantive matter; each party's financial position after the deal. See:
id. at 140, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
250. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 4-9 at 170.
251. Murphree, 632 F.2d at 420 ("Illinois courts will readily apply the unconscionability doc-
trine to contracts between consumers and skilled corporate sellers, [but] they are reluctant to re-
write the terms of a negotiated contract between businessmen"); Salt River, 143 Ariz. at 374, 694
P.2d at 204 (although commercial purchaser not doomed to failure in pressing an unconscionability
claim, "findings of unconscionability in a commercial settings are rare"); Dillman, 110 Il1. App. 3d
at 343, 442 N.E.2d at 317 (case involved "businessmen of equal sophistication" and not "an exper-
ienced businessman taking unfair advantage of a poorly educated consumer"). But see A & M Pro-
duce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 489-90, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124 ("courts have begun to recognize that
experienced but legally sophisticated businessmen may be unfairly surprised by unconscionable con-
tract terms ... and that even large business entities may have relatively little bargaining power,
depending on the identity of the other contracting party and the commercial circumstances sur-
rounding the agreement") (emphasis in original).
252. Eg., Feeders, 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 544 (plaintiff a large farming corporation, not an
unwitting and uneducated purchaser of a household necessity); Dillman, 110 111. App. 3d at 343, 442
N.E.2d at 317 (quoted in the preceding note).
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minative factors in commercial cases. 253
As noted above, 254 though, the courts sometimes differ on the im-
portance of matters such as bargaining power, negotiations, and knowl-
edge of the disclaimer,255 and these disagreements usually occur in the
commercial context. In addition, since roughly one-third of the courts
deciding in this context found the disclaimer unconscionable, a signifi-
cant minority apparently is unimpressed with the basic assumption that
business parties can protect themselves from unknown and unwanted im-
plied warranty disclaimers. Obviously, such broad terms as "business
parties" and "commercial context" encompass a congeries of actors who
differ greatly in size, power, and sophistication. When we take these dif-
ferences into account by classifying the business/commercial cases ac-
cording to the relative size256 of the parties, we go some way toward
explaining the differences noted above. In the relatively few cases where
both parties are large corporations, for instance, the courts invariably
reject any claim that the disclaimer is unconscionable. 25 7 With a few
exceptions, 258 the same result obtains when each party is a business actor
of small to medium size. 259 However, the courts do deviate in cases
where such a small-to-medium-sized party attacks a large corporation's
253. For an exception to this generalization, see A & M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 343, 186
Cal. Rptr. at 125-26 (disclaimer unconscionable, and substantive unconscionability given separate
discussion and seemingly treated as important aspect of case). Also, cf Martin, 41 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. at 322-23 (considering harm disclaimer would cause buyer and burden on seller to correct
defect).
254. See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
255. In some cases, it should be noted, courts come close to adopting the rule that a commercial
purchaser will be presumed to have read the contract and understood the disclaimer included within
it. E.g., Feeders, 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 544 (reasonable farmer would read disclaimer carefully
before deciding to purchase Lasso herbicide); Tacoma Boatbuilding, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 37-38
(commercial parties generally held to their contracts whether they read them or not; test whether
purchaser knew or should have known of challenged terms; question is one of actual or constructive
notice). Cf Badger, 444 F. Supp. at 923 (businessman must be deemed to possess some commercial
sophistication and familiarity with disclaimers).
256. In doing so, I am of course assuming that there is some correlation between size, on the one
hand, and bargaining power, business sophistication, etc., on the other.
257. See Salt River, 143 Ariz. 368, 694 P.2d 198 (large electric utility and Westinghouse Electric
Corporation); Jorgensen, 56 Hawaii 466, 540 P.2d at 978 (buyer construction contractor with multi-
million dollar business and number of large projects; characteristics of seller unclear, but statement
that there is no great disparity in power of parties) (unclear whether case involves disclaimer, rem-
edy limitation, or both). See also Tacoma Boatbuilding, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 26 (where all relevant
parties probably possessed significant size and power, but where, in finding disclaimer conscionable,
court focused on relations between parties other than those claiming unconscionability).
258. See, e.g., Butcher, 20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (sawmill operator versus newly-estab-
lished business marketing portable small log sawmill).
259. See Dillman, 110 Il1. App. 3d 335, 442 N.E.2d 311 (preparer of tax returns versus lessor of
copier); R.D. Lowrance, 185 Neb. 679, 178 N.W.2d 277 (pharmacist operating commercial feedlot
versus corporation selling cattle); Bill Stremmel, 89 Nev. 414, 514 P.2d 654 (auto dealer versus lessor
of communications system). Cf US. Fibres, 358 F. Supp. 449 (size of parties difficult to ascertain,
but apparently neither a corporate "giant").
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disclaimer on unconscionability grounds.2 60  This is most apparent in a
fact pattern common to three of the cases in this last category: the situa-
tion where a farmer purchases a herbicide from a large corporate manu-
facturer.26' It is within this final class of cases that many of the courts'
disagreements about the importance of bargaining power, negotiations,
and knowledge occur.
262




As the previous section demonstrated, the courts have largely
mooted Professor Left's arguments against the application of U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-302 to implied warranty disclaimers by overwhelmingly conclud-
ing that such disclaimers may be unconscionable even though they satisfy
section 2-316. As we have also seen, however, the courts tend to go their
separate ways when actually applying section 2-302 in the implied war-
ranty disclaimer context. Assuming that such disclaimers may be at-
tacked under section 2-302, what approach should courts take when
determining whether or not they are unconscionable? As will soon be-
come apparent, any attempt to answer this question forces one to con-
sider a wide range of somewhat incommensurable policy factors.
To structure the fairly complicated inquiry that follows, this section
will consider what appear to be the three main policy arguments for the
260. Finding the disclaimer conscionable in this context are: Murphree, 632 F.2d 413 (closely
held corporation running shuttle service versus leasing subsidiary of FMC Finance Corporation);
Feeders, 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 541 (cattle feeding and farming corporation versus Monsanto Corpo-
ration); Badger, 444 F. Supp. 919 (corporation in business of distributing bearings and power trans-
mission components versus Burroughs Corporation); Edenfield, 35 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 781
(experienced and knowledgeable farmer versus Monsanto Corporation; possible confusion of implied
warranty disclaimer and remedy limitation); Macarr, 70 Misc. 2d 495, 333 N.Y.S.2d 818 (corpora-
tion selling rectifiers versus Westinghouse). Finding the disclaimer unconscionable are: Martin, 41
U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 319-23 (farmers versus large national producer and distributor of seed); A &
M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (farming company solely owned by exper-
ienced farmer versus FMC Corporation); Industralease, 58 A.D.2d 482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (corpora-
tion owning 40-acre picnic grove versus manufacturer and seller of incinerator); Durham, 315
N.W.2d 696 (farmer versus Ciba-Geigy Corporation; reference to implied warranty disclaimer prob-
ably dictum, because express warranty breached).
261. Compare Feeders, 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 544, and Edenfield, 35 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at
784-87 (the latter possibly confusing disclaimer and remedy limitation) with Durham, 315 N.W.2d at
700-01 (where reference to disclaimer likely dictum due to breach of express warranty). Cf Martin,
41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 319-23 (finding disclaimer unconscionable where farmers purchased defec-
tive cabbage seed).
262. Compare, e.g., Murphree, 632 F.2d at 420, and Feeders, 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 544, with
A & MProduce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 490-91, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25. TheA & MProduce case is
discussed in detail at infra notes 308-22 and accompanying text.
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enforcement of implied warranty disclaimers and against the idea that
section 2-302 should be used to police them. These arguments, each of
which is treated in a separate subsection, are based on: 1) traditional
"freedom of contract" values; 2) the economic benefits that presumably
flow from enforcing disclaimers; and 3) a syndrome of arguments whose
central theme is the idea that employing unconscionability to scrutinize
disclaimers offends rule of law values. Each subsection below concludes
with a statement of that subsection's implications for the legal treatment
of implied warranty disclaimers. These concluding statements are cumu-
lative in the sense that each is based on the considerations raised in the
subsection where they appear and those raised in preceding subsections
(if any). Thus, the first subsection's conclusions about the enforceability
of implied warranty disclaimers only reflect that subsection's position on
the freedom of contract issues raised there. The next subsection's conclu-
sions reflect both the economic arguments considered there and the mat-
ters discussed in the first subsection. The third subsection concludes
with the article's overall position on the unconscionability doctrine's ap-
plication to implied warranty disclaimers.
This section's policy discussion might seem better directed to the
legislatures263 than to courts utilizing section 2-302, but the unconsciona-
bility doctrine is surely flexible enough to accomodate and reflect the
concerns discussed below. 264 And the conclusions the section reaches,
while significantly restricting the effectiveness of implied warranty dis-
claimers, are not especially radical. The first such conclusion is that im-
plied warranty disclaimers should always be unconscionable in consumer
cases. Although the 2-302 cases just discussed do little to suggest such a
rule,265 it merely replicates the results already obtained under other
product liability theories266 and reinforces the severe restrictions imposed
by the Magnuson-Moss Act 267 and some state statutes.268 Given all these
263. Indeed, as noted immediately below, Congress and the state legislatures do seem to have
responded to considerations of the sort raised in this section.
264. Cf Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 754 (1982)
(unconscionability a paradigmatic concept that can never be exhaustively described).
265. However, Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 242, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538, 539-40 (1969)
may have announced a qualified per se ban on implied warranty disclaimers when it stated that: "In
the absence of factual evidence indicating [that] the limitation or exclusion is commercially reason-
able and fair rather than oppressive and surprising to a purchaser of a new vehicle, it must be
stricken as a matter of law." In making this statement, the court cited Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., see supra note 235. Also, cf Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441,
447-50, 240 A.2d 195, 198-200 (1968) (also relying on Henningsen and overall quite hostile to im-
plied warranty disclaimers in the consumer context).
266. Disclaimers will rarely, if ever, be effective in consumer suits proceeding under negligence
or RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See supra notes 36-37.
267. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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limitations on the enforceability of implied warranty disclaimers in the
consumer context, it might appear redundant to attack them on uncon-
scionability grounds as well. However, the limitations are not of univer-
sal application. 269 Perhaps for this reason, consumer unconscionability
challenges to implied warranty disclaimers continue to be litigated270 and
presumably remain important. Also, this section's final position on the
enforceability of implied warranty disclaimers in the commercial context
depends to a large degree on policy considerations first developed in the
consumer situation and most sharply focused in that area. In business or
commercial situations, the section concludes, standards similar to those
governing waivers of negligence liability27 1 should be controlling in the
implied warranty context. This conclusion plainly flies in the face of
much of the case law discussed above, but cases with a similar general
orientation do appear within that body of law. 272
B. The Freedom of Contract Rationale
1. The Argument and Its Twentieth Century Demise
The first argument for enforcing implied warranty disclaimers and
limiting the courts' ability to police them under U.C.C. section 2-302 is
almost too familiar for discussion. Freedom of contract, all would pre-
sumably agree, is an extremely important public policy. One aspect of
this freedom is the idea that, to the maximum extent possible, the parties
should be able to set the terms of their agreement. This ensures that they
will be legally bound only on terms to which they have given voluntary
and knowing consent. Thus, since sales of goods are voluntary contrac-
tual agreements, and since disclaimers are terms of those contracts, dis-
claimers should be enforced. To deny them enforcement would be to
contravene the parties' objectively expressed 273 mutual intent.
By now, the objections to this traditional argument are almost as
269. Usually, plaintiffs using negligence or § 402A can only recover for personal injury or prop-
erty damage. See supra notes 47-48. Also, there are still a few states that have not adopted § 402A.
See supra note 7. The relevant portions of the Magnuson-Moss Act do not apply to goods costing
less than $10 per item, and a seller can avoid the Act's strictures simply by refusing to give a written
warranty. See supra notes 87-88, 92 and accompanying text. Finally, only a few states have directly
invalidated implied warranty disclaimers in consumer cases. See supra notes 82-83 and accompany-
ing text.
270. For some 1980's examples, see Seekings v. Jimmy GMC, 130 Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210
(1981); Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943 (Ind. App. 1982); Evans v. Graham Ford, Inc., 2
Ohio App. 3d 435, 442 N.E.2d 777 (1981).
271. See supra note 36.
272. The most conspicuous example is A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d
473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982), discussed at infra notes 308-22 and accompanying text.
273. Under the objective theory of contract, actual knowledge of standard form contract terms is
not necessary for such terms to be binding. Rather, it has been presumed that the parties know and
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familiar as the argument itself. As Professor Todd Rakoff has recently
noted, freedom of contract arguments often presuppose an implicit soci-
ology, "the image of individuals meeting in the marketplace. '274 For
much of the nineteenth century, this image often may have corresponded
to social reality. As Friedrich Kessler once observed: "The individual-
ism of our rules of contract law, of which freedom of contract is the most
powerful symbol, is closely tied up with the ethics of free enterprise capi-
talism and the ideals of justice of a mobile society of small enterprisers,
individual merchants and independent craftsmen. ' 275 Certainly the
"classical" contract law of the nineteenth century-with its mutually
reinforcing postulates of freedom, equality between the parties, and the
negative, "nightwatchman" state276-reflected this implicit sociology. 277
It did so mainly because its assumption of equal bargaining power pos-
sessed considerable validity in a society where most contracts were made
by Kessler's small enterprisers, merchants, and craftsmen. In such an
environment, private restrictions on contractual freedom were probably
fairly infrequent, since there were relatively few parties with the ability to
impose them. And, while the power of government was still a plausible
threat to contractual autonomy, courts and legislatures in fact tended to
adopt a "hands off" attitude toward private contracts. 278
What undermined the classical nineteenth century synthesis was the
demise of the social conditions on which it rested. Specifically, "[t]he
foundations of the theory were shattered when corporations increasingly
displaced physical persons as legal individuals, and as parties to commer-
cial and industrial contracts. ' 279 The rise of the corporation (and other
private groups) upset the nineteenth century equality postulate by creat-
ing innumerable situations where contracting parties dealt on an unequal
footing. These disparities in bargaining position manifested themselves
in many ways; among the most prominent has been the ubiquitous stan-
understand the contents of the forms they execute. E.g., E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 4.26, at
295-96.
274. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1216
(1983).
275. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 629, 640 (1943).
276. See W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 10, at 119-29.
277. For more on the general characteristics of nineteenth century contract law and their rela-
tion to nineteenth century society, see Metzger & Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as
an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 475-81, 501-02 (1983) and sources
cited there.
278. "The idea that the state on behalf of the community should intervene to dictate or alter
terms of contracts in the public interest, is, on the whole, alien to the classical theory of common-law
contract." W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 10, at 123.
279. Id.
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dard form contract 280 commonly used by business firms of all sorts.28'
As Kessler once observed:
With the decline of the free enterprise system due to the innate
trend of competitive capitalism toward monopoly, the meaning of con-
tract has changed radically. Society, when granting freedom of con-
tract, does not guarantee that all members of the community will be
able to make use of it to the same extent. On the contrary, the law, by
protecting the unequal distribution of property, does nothing to pre-
vent freedom of contract from becoming a one-sided privilege. Society,
by proclaiming freedom of contract, guarantees that it will not inter-
fere with the exercise of power by contract. Freedom of contract en-
ables enterprisers to legislate by contract and, what is even more
important, to legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner without
using the appearance of authoritarian forms. Standard contracts in
particular could thus become effective instruments in the hands of
powerful industrial and commercial overlords enabling them to impose
a new feudal order of their own making upon a vast host of vassals....
Thus the return back from contract to status which we experience to-
day was greatly facilitated by the fact that the belief in freedom of
contract has remained one of the firmest axioms in the whole fabric of
the social philosophy of our culture.
282
In the contemporary social environment, that is, the traditional freedom
of contract rationale often allows standard form contracting to become
private law-making. 283
Ordinarily, the power which firms exercise through standard forms
does not spring from any duress or other external compulsion directed
280. Implied warranty disclaimers are "packaged" in many different ways, but throughout this
article I am assuming either that they qualify as "standard form" terms, or at least deserve the same
legal treatment as standard form terms. Indeed, implied warranty disclaimers also might qualify as
"adhesive" terms. For one definition of the term "contract of adhesion," see Rakoff, supra note 274,
at 1177. The typical seller's or manufacturer's standard form express warranty and implied war-
ranty disclaimer seems to meet six of the seven tests set by Professor Rakoff. And the only missing
element-the buyer's signature-may be present in some cases where implied warranties are dis-
claimed. However, Rakoff excludes from his definition "secondary issues that might cloud efforts at
analysis," among them "apparently contractual documents that are never signed, such as some 'war-
ranties.' " Id. But then he states that "the presence of such issues would not improve the case for
legal enforcement of the form language." Id.
281. Kessler, supra note 275, at 632 suggests that "[s]tandard contracts are typically used by
enterprises with strong bargaining power." This power, he then asserts, arises either because "the
author of the standard contract has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors use
the same clauses." Id. Rakoff, however, takes issue with Kessler here, arguing that standard forms
are used by all sorts of firms in all kinds of industries. Rakoff, supra note 274, at 1218-19. On the
reasons for the widespread use of standard forms, see infra text surrounding notes 350-53.
282. Kessler, supra note 275, at 640.
283. The privately made law imposed by standard form has not only engulfed the law of
contract; it has become a considerable portion of all the law to which we are subject. If by
making law we mean imposing officially enforceable duties or creating or restricting offi-
cially enforceable rights, then automobile manufacturers make more warranty law in a day
than most legislatures or courts make in a year.
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV.
529, 530 (1971).
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against the weaker party. Instead, it usually results from disparities in
organization, experience, attention, foresight, and general business so-
phistication between the parties, and from the context in which they con-
tract. It seems to be generally agreed that consumers or other
individuals who contract by standard form, while perhaps aware of the
few specifically bargained terms, rarely read the forms, would not under-
stand most form terms if they were read, and are not warned about the
presence of disadvantageous form terms.284 Even if such parties are
aware of disadvantageous terms, there may be little they can do to bar-
gain them away.2 85 For reasons discussed below,2 86 the party offering the
form may be reluctant to depart from the standard boilerplate. "Shop-
ping around" for better terms is time-consuming, and will be of little
avail if (as may often be the case in oligopolistic industries) the firm's
competitors offer substantially the same form terms. 287 Finally, since
disadvantageous form clauses often deal with contingencies that may
never occur, there is a natural disposition toward discounting their im-
portance and hoping for the best while accepting the standard terms.
28 8
All these considerations, however, seem less applicable where the
"weaker" party is itself a business organization of some size, power, ex-
perience, and sophistication. In such cases, the traditional freedom of
contract argument may still possess much force.28 9
2. The Implied Warranty Disclaimer Context
The points just raised lead to the conclusion that freedom of con-
tract in its traditional sense is often an illusion in the standard form con-
text. Radkoff has reached a similar conclusion:
Refusal to enforce a contract of adhesion, the courts say, trenches
on freedom of contract. Implicit in the argument is an equating of the
284. A party who makes regular use of a standardized form of agreement does not ordina-
rily expect his customers to understand or even to read the standard terms. One of the
purposes of standardization is to eliminate bargaining over details of individual transac-
tions, and that purpose would not be served if a substantial number of customers retained
counsel and reviewed the standard terms .... Customers do not in fact ordinarily under-
stand or even read the standard terms.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211, Comment b (1981). See also, e.g., Rakoff, supra
note 274, at 1179 & nn.21-22 (citing numerous commentators who declare that standard terms not
read or understood, and some empirical studies asserting same proposition); Slawson, supra note
283, at 530, 544 (standard form terms not read, not understood if read, and not drawn to buyer's
attention).
285. For a summary of the reasons why this is so, see Rakoff, supra note 274, at 1225-29.
286. See infra text surrounding notes 350-53.
287. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 86-87 (noting
situation in the automobile industry); Kessler, supra note 275, at 632.
288. Cf Leff II, supra note 1, at 351; Rakoff, supra note 274, at 1226.
289. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 274, at 1253-54.
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drafting organization with a live individual. For what gives value to
uncoerced choice-the type of freedom that the courts have in mind-
is its connection to the human being, to his growth and development,
his individuation, his fulfillment by doing. But the enforcement of the
organization's form does not further these fundamental human values;
the standard document grows out of and expresses the needs and dy-
namics of the organization. To see a contract of adhesion as the exten-
sion and fulfillment of the will of an individual entrepreneur, entitled
to do business as he sees fit, is incongruous .... Once it is recognized
that contracts of adhesion arise from the matrix of organizational hier-
archy, the argument for enforcement of form terms as a recognition of
"freedom of contract" in its usual sense is unsupportable.
' 290
In response to this perception, of course, the twentieth century has wit-
nessed innumerable instances of government intervention into private
contracts. This intervention has usually proceeded with the avowed aim
of protecting weaker contracting parties. In general, it has taken two
forms: the dictation or implication of protective terms, and the excision
or reformation of offensive terms. Article 2's implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness are obvious examples of the first tactic. One
instance of the second is the unconscionability doctrine recognized by
U.C.C. section 2-302.291 Section 2-316's disclaimer rules, on the other
hand, are characterizable as a freedom of contract-based counterattack
on the Code's implied warranties. 292 But if the preceding analysis applies
to implied warranty disclaimers, freedom of contract values seem ill-
suited for justifying their enforcement. This, in turn, would appear to
allow the courts wide discretion to invalidate implied warranties under
section 2-302. What remains to be considered is whether and to what
extent the preceding arguments govern the implied warranty disclaimer
context.
Consumer Cases. As we have seen, there are numerous reasons for
concluding that the enforceability of standard form contracts cannot be
based on a freedom of contract rationale. These reasons seem equally, if
not more, persuasive in the situation where a consumer purchases a prod-
uct with an implied warranty disclaimer.293 It seems safe to assume that
sellers are not in the habit of pointing out implied warranty disclaimers
290. Id. at 1236-37.
291. Leff II, supra note 1, at 350 (unconscionability one form of governmental regulation in
contract cases).
292. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 12-1, at 427 (ability to disclaim implied warran-
ties means that feedom of contract gives seller some protection against them).
293. In the discussion below, I rely heavily on my personal experience and observations regard-
ing consumer sales. In doing so, I am assuming that the assertions I make are matters of common
experience requiring little or no corroboration in the form of authority. The reader, of course, is
invited to compare his or her own experience and perceptions with mine.
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to consumers.294 And it is difficult to believe that consumers actually
read such disclaimers at or before the time of the sale.295 In fact, the
realities of much consumer merchandising suggest that, as compared
with other form terms, disclaimers have less chance of being read. Many
consumer purchases are relatively hurried affairs in which the product's
price and features tend to be the main points of concern. Only with diffi-
culty can one imagine customers of Sears and K-Mart studiously reading
the sale contract before making a purchase. 296 Moreover, many such
sales do not involve a written contract that is presented and signed before
the goods change hands. More often, the disclaimer is contained inside
the package and normally is not seen until after the sale is completed. 297
Even when implied warranty disclaimers are read, it is very unlikely
that their legal significance is understood. While consumer purchasers
often seem concerned about express warranties and may understand their
principal terms,298 implied warranty disclaimers are a different matter
entirely. Such disclaimers include unfamiliar terminology (e.g., "implied
warranty of merchantability"). And comprehending their legal effect re-
quires one to understand what it means to eliminate all liability under a
particular theory of recovery,299 and also to grasp what has been lost via
the disclaimer (i.e., the substantive rights granted by the theory that is
disclaimed). No doubt some consumers who make a conscientious effort
to read implied warranty disclaimers will become aware that they are
giving up certain recovery rights that would otherwise be theirs once the
goods turn out to be defective. But it is difficult to see how they could
fully comprehend much more than this.
Even if a consumer somehow manages to read and comprehend an
implied warranty disclaimer before the sale, other problems remain.
Since the practice of disclaiming implied warranties is widespread,
"shopping around" for better terms ordinarily will not be a viable op-
tion. 3°° Even where this is not true, shopping around consumes time
(and perhaps resources). Also, disclaimers deal with a contingent event
294. "It is common knowledge that salesmen almost never draw the purchaser's attention to the
disclaimers prior to the sale of packaged goods." Slawson, supra note 283, at 544.
295. Id. (referring to surveys regarding the behavior of car buyers).
296. In purchases of "big-ticket" items such as automobiles, there is admittedly more time to
peruse the seller's and manufacturer's standard forms. But there is considerable reason to doubt that
the forms are read even in this context. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
297. Slawson, supra note 283, at 541.
298. See id. at 548 (noting the warranty competition that has occasionally occurred in the auto-
mobile industry).
299. Even some courts have difficulty distinguishing between liability disclaimers and remedy
limitations. Eg., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 12-11, at 471-72.
300. Also, there are many reasons why firms are disinclined to bargain away standard form
terms on a situation-by-situation basis. See infra text accompanying notes 351-53.
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that may never come to pass-the possibility that the goods will turn out
to be defective. Hence, even a consumer who fully understands the im-
port of a known implied warranty disclaimer may be relatively uncon-
cerned about its presence. This is especially likely to be true where, as is
not uncommon, the consumer's main concern is the swift acquisition of a
highly desired product.
30 1
For all the reasons just stated, the freedom of contract argument
provides a tenuous basis for enforcing implied warranty disclaimers in
consumer cases. In such situations, it is highly unlikely that the con-
sumer's assent is knowing. Even where knowledge and understanding
are present, the assent itself is not especially voluntary.30 2 Typically, that
is, the informed consumer acquiesces only because no better choices are
available, the cost of discovering them is too high, or the disclaimer is
perceived to deal with a relatively insignificant contingency. In con-
sumer cases, therefore, the content of the sales contract is largely dictated
by the seller or manufacturer and expresses its desires, not the con-
sumer's. Thus, it can hardly be regarded as a product of the consumer's
knowing and voluntary assent.
Commercial Cases. At first glance, commercial deals involving busi-
ness parties seem much different from the consumer transactions just de-
scribed. Here, we have more or less sophisticated parties who are much
more apt to read the seller's form. While, for the reasons stated above,
even these parties may have trouble grasping the legal significance of an
implied warranty disclaimer, they may have the time and resources to
301. Here, I will interject a personal note whose wider relevance is for the reader to decide. I
have taught U.C.C. § 2-316's disclaimer rules for eight years and have been able to recall them at
will for most of that time. Needless to say, I have also made numerous consumer purchases (includ-
ing two automobiles) during this period. Never once has the presence or absence of an implied
warranty disclaimer been of any concern to me at the time of purchase. In fact, I cannot recall ever
reading such a disclaimer before making the purchase, or feeling the slightest inclination to do so.
No doubt, one of the reasons for my unconcern with implied warranty disclaimers has been the
assumption (correct or not) that all sellers will inevitably disclaim them, but this is an assumption
that I have never even considered testing. For most of the purchases in question, my main concern
was with price, options, and so forth. In some, my main concern was simply the obtaining of the
consumer item and nothing else. My behavior may be aberrational, but I am inclined to doubt it.
Cf. Rakoff, supra note 274, at 1179 n.22 ("I have asked many lawyers and law professors over the
past few years whether they ever read various form documents, such as their bank-card agreements;
the great majority of even this highly sophisticated sample do not.").
302. In this context, it is irrelevant to assert that what counts is the consumer's manifested
assent to the disclaimer. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(1), (2) (1981) (stating
a rule of manifested assent probably broad enough to cover the consumer/implied warranty dis-
claimer situation). In this section of the article, we are concerned with a particular policy basis for
enforcing a disclaimer: the buyer's knowing and voluntary assent to it. The objective theory of
contract on which the manifested assent rule rests may have other policy justifications, e.g., J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 94, § 2-2, at 25 (suggesting that one basis of objective theory
need to preserve security of business transactions), but here we are mainly concerned with free sub-
jective assent.
UNCONSCIONABILITY AND ARTICLE 2
employ an attorney to examine the seller's form. Needless to say, such
parties are also more likely to recognize the disclaimer's importance as a
risk-allocation device, 30 3 to shop around for better terms, and to attempt
to bargain the disclaimer away. Also, their bargaining position may be
improved by their tendency to make high-volume purchases, which can
represent a significant business opportuntity for the seller. Also, some
commercial purchases are "one-shot" deals for expensive equipment, and
in these situations the seller may have less incentive to use a standard




As discussed earlier, however, the "business/commercial" category
is a broad one that encompasses a wide range of possible buyers. In
certain contexts, some of these "business" purchasers are not easily dis-
tinguishable from ordinary consumers. 30 5 A farmer purchasing Lasso
herbicide, 30 6 for example, is usually not as well-equipped to protect him-
self as a large electrical utility purchasing a manual control system for a
gas turbine generator. 30 7 What this suggests is that the desirability of
enforcing an implied warranty disclaimer in commercial cases varies
with the nature of the parties and the context in which the transaction
occurs. This, in turn, means that courts considering the unconscionabil-
ity of implied warranty disclaimers in the commercial context must make
individualized case-by-case determinations. A relatively recent Califor-
nia decision suggests the general sort of inquiry that they should
undertake.
In relevant part, A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp. 308 was an implied
warranty of fitness suit for economic losses3°9 caused by a defective
weight-sizer which was to sort tomatoes by size. A & M Produce, the
plaintiff, was a farming company solely owned by C. Alex Abatti. Abatti
had been a farmer all his life, but had never farmed tomatoes and was
unfamiliar with weight-sizing equipment. After discussions with FMC
salesmen and in reliance on their recommendations, Abatti purchased a
303. For one thing, such purchasers are more likely to suffer indirect economic loss if the goods
are defective, and, because of their familiarity with their own businesses, to anticipate this.
304. The point is that sellers are more likely to need and employ standard forms where they
make large numbers of contracts that are essentially similar in most relevant respects.
305. See Sarfati v. M.A. Hittner & Sons, 35 A.D.2d 1004, 1005, 318 N.Y.S.2d 352, 354 (1971)
(small business lessor of car in no better position than ordinary consumer).
306. E.g., Feeders, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 541 (D. Minn.
1981).
307. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 143
Ariz. 368, 694 P.2d 198 (1984). However, it is arguable that there was a disparity in bargaining
power in this case despite the size of the buyer. See id. at 373, 694 P.2d at 203.
308. 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982).
309. The court was unclear on the point, but it seems that A & M was mainly suing to recover
crop losses.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
weight-sizer from FMC. The sale contract contained an implied war-
ranty disclaimer satisfying U.C.C. section 2-316(2).3o After the weight-
sizer proved unfit for A & M's purposes, Abatti sued, winning a $255,000
judgment (plus $45,000 in attorney's fees) at the trial court level. The
trial court had found FMC's implied warranty disclaimer unconsciona-
ble, and this holding was the main issue confronting the court after
FMC's appeal.
After concluding that U.C.C. section 2-302 could apply to an im-
plied warranty disclaimer satisfying section 2-316, 311 the appellate court
undertook a general examination of the unconscionability doctrine, one
that emphasized the distinction between procedural and substantive un-
conscionability.312 Then it applied this analysis to the disclaimer before
it.3 '3 In considering procedural unconscionability, the court first noted
that "this contract arises in a commercial context between an enormous
diversified corporation (FMC) and a relatively small but experienced
farming company (A & M). '"314 Generally, it continued, unconscionabil-
ity claims by businessmen do not find favor with the courts. But "[w]ith
increasing frequency," it stated, "courts have begun to recognize that
experienced but legally unsophisticated businessmen may be unfairly sur-
prised by unconscionable contract terms... and that even large business
entities may have relatively little bargaining power, depending on the
identity of the other contracting party and the commercial circumstances
surrounding the agreement. '315 Turning to the "unfair surprise" aspect
of unconscionability, 31 6 the court strongly suggested that Abatti was un-
fairly surprised because, among other things, the disclaimer appeared in
the middle of the back page of a long preprinted form contract, FMC's
salesmen never suggested that Abatti read the back of the form, and
Abatti in fact did not read it. Then, however, the court conceded that
Abatti did have abundant opportunity to read the contract and to consult
a lawyer. Still, it concluded, the length and complexity of the contract
and FMC's failure to direct Abatti's attention to it implied that his fail-
ures "may not be totally unreasonable.
'31 7
Even if the unfair surprise argument is ignored, the court went on,
310. The sale contract also contained a consequential damages limitation.
311. 135 Cal. App. 3d at 483-85, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 120-21.
312. See id. at 485-88, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121-23.
313. The court appeared to consider the unconscionability of the consequential damages limita-
tion along with the unconscionability of the disclaimer. It also raised some additional considerations
that seemingly were relevant only to the former. See id. at 492-93, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
314. Id. at 489, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
315. Id. at 489-90, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124 (emphasis in original).
316. See supra note 122.
317. 135 Cal. App. 3d at 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
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the disparity in bargaining power between the parties and the lack of any
real negotiation over contract terms were by themselves sufficient for
procedural unconscionability. On the first point, the court seemed to use
the vast difference in size between A & M and FMC 318 as a proxy for
unequal bargaining power. On the second, it emphasized that FMC's
sales force was instructed to adhere to the firm's standard form terms
and was given little or no discretion to bargain regarding them.
Although the court could perhaps have made the point more
clearly, 319 it seemed to require both procedural and substantive uncon-
scionability for an overall finding of unconscionability. And it had little
difficulty concluding that the latter form of unconscionability was pres-
ent. First, the court noted that this is a case where the implied warranty
disclaimer basically left the buyer without a remedy in case the product
was defective. 320 Also, after pointing out that A & M's inexperience with
weight-sizing equipment forced it to rely on FMC's expertise and repre-
sentations and that FMC was aware of this, it declared that "[a] seller's
attempt, through the use of a disclaimer, to prevent the buyer from rea-
sonably relying on such representations calls into question the commer-
cial reasonableness of the agreement and may well be substantively
unconscionable."
321
Admittedly, the arguments made by the court in the A & M Produce
case are less than impregnable. Its conclusion regarding procedural un-
conscionability relied heavily on an asserted inequality of bargaining
318. "Although it was conceded that A & M was a large-scale farming enterprise by Imperial
Valley standards, employing five persons on a regular basis and up to fifty seasonal employees at
harvest time, and that Abatti was farming some 8,000 acres in 1974, FMC Corporation is in an
entirely different category. The 1974 gross sales of the Agricultural Machinery Division alone
amounted to $40 million." Id. at 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125. This language was the court's sole
justification for its conclusion that superior bargaining power existed.
319. During its general discussion of unconscionability, the court stated that "commercial prac-
ticalities dictate that unbargained for terms only be denied enforcement where they are also substan-
tively unreasonable." Id. at 487, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122 (emphasis in original). Later in its opinion,
the court stated that: "When non-negotiable terms on preprinted form agreements combine with
disparate bargaining power, resulting in the allocation of commercial risks in a socially or economi-
cally unreasonable manner, the concept of unconscionability . . . furnishes legal justification for
refusing enforcement of the offensive result." Id. at 493, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
320. The warranty allegedly breached by FMC went to the basic performance characteris-
tics of the product. In attempting to disclaim this and all other warranties, FMC was in
essence guarantying nothing about what the product would do. Since a product's perform-
ance forms the fundamental basis for a sales contract, it is patently unreasonable to assume
that a buyer would purchase a standardized mass-produced product from an industry seller
without any enforceable performance standards.
Id. at 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125. However, the plaintiff had also mounted an express warranty suit,
and the court had earlier stated that, even if the trial court had erred in holding that the disclaimer
was unconscionable, the error was harmless because express warranty liability was available as an
alternative basis for the trial court's judgment. See id. at 485 n.10, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121 n.10.
321. Id. at 492, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
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power, but in reaching this conclusion the court relied solely on the dis-
parity in the size of the parties and ignored the possibility that Abatti
may have been able to seek better terms elsewhere.3 22 Also, it is arguable
that the court should have given more weight to Abatti's failure to read
the contract and to seek legal help. Moreover, it seems that the court's
discussion of substantive unconscionability was heavily influenced by the
fact that A & M Produce was an implied warranty of fitness case in which
the buyer's reliance on the seller's judgment was crucial. Thus, its rea-
soning regarding substantive unconscionability may be inapplicable in
implied warranty of merchantability cases. Despite all this, the A & M
Produce decision well illustrates the type of analysis the courts should be
employing where an implied warranty disclaimer is attacked as uncon-
scionable in the commercial context. And its approach is infinitely pref-
erable to the prevailing tendency to insulate commercial contracts from
unconscionability challenges.
3. Summary
If the considerations discussed in this subsection were the only mat-
ters relevant in determining how courts should treat implied warranty
disclaimers under section 2-302, it would seem that such disclaimers
should always be struck down in the consumer context, and that highly
individualized determinations are necessary in commercial situations. In
the latter context, disclaimers should generally have the greatest chance
of being enforced where both parties are large and sophisticated corpora-
tions, because equal bargaining power and knowledge of the contract's
terms are most likely to be found here. Due to the likelihood of equal
bargaining power, disclaimer clauses in sales between small-to-medium-
sized business actors should usually be next most deserving of enforce-
ment. Least entitled to judicial backing, are disclaimers accompanying
sales by corporate giants to smaller business entities, and commercial
sales in which there is little to distinguish the "business" buyer from an
ordinary consumer.
However, this section has examined only one set of considerations
relevant to the enforcement of implied warranty disclaimers, and there
are other policy arguments that might produce a different set of conclu-
sions. In fact, this section is not the last word on the freedom of contract
322. Before dealing with FMC, Abatti had discussed the purchase of a weight-sizer from another
firm, which informed him that a hydrocooler would be needed to supplement the weight-sizer. For
this reason, the firm's bid was too high for Abatti's taste, and he then turned to FMC. It appears
that the absence of a hydrocooler contributed to A & M's losses. See id. at 478-79, 186 Cal. Rptr. at
117-18.
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rationale that is its central theme. First, it is possible that "supercon-
scionability" in the form of "superdisclosure 323 may eliminate some of
the mentioned problems with enforcing implied warranty disclaimers.
Second, if we shift our focus away from the buyer's actual knowledge of
the disclaimer by asking whether a fully informed buyer would have as-
sented to it,324 we may be able to avoid the conclusions reached here.
Both these possibilities, however, are intertwined with the economic ar-
guments discussed immediately below, and, in the interest of avoiding
repetition, are raised there.
C. The Economic Arguments
Although often embracing laissez-faire themes, the next set of policy
arguments for enforcing implied warranty disclaimers is primarily of an
economic nature. In this subsection, the freedom of contract rationale
for enforcing disclaimers is less an end in itself than a means for maxi-
mizing economic welfare. The first economic consideration relevant to
implied warranty disclaimers, however, is not of a free-market variety.
Nor does it directly support the proposition that disclaimers should be
enforced. Instead, it stresses that refusing to enforce implied warranty
disclaimers involves undeniable economic costs.
1. The Economic Costs of Invalidating Implied
Warranty Disclaimers
A major theme throughout this subsection is the assertion that stan-
dard form contracts are an essential component of the modern American
system of mass production and mass consumption, and that the system
would function less efficiently in their absence. As Professor Leff once
remarked, "it is arguable that mass production is the source of a vast
total increase in economic welfare, and that successful mass production
requires mass distribution by documents also inalterably mass-produced,
or briefly, that one can no more efficiently customize contracts than cus-
tomize goods for a mass market without losing all of the economic gains
of non-customized production. ' 325 Although Leff was vehemently op-
posed to section 2-302's application in the implied warranty disclaimer
context, his opposition did not rest on the freedom of contract rationale
discussed above. 326 He recognized that, in consumer transactions at
323. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
324. By way of anticipation, the reason why a fully informed buyer might assent to an implied
warranty disclaimer is that he could obtain a lower price by doing so.
325. Leff II, supra note 1, at 350-51.
326. The real basis of Leff's objections to using § 2-302 to police implied warranty disclaimers is
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least, the buyer's assent to standard form terms is hardly ever knowing
and voluntary. "[T]o attempt to regulate the consumer contracting pro-
cess," he asserted, "is frequently to attempt to regulate a process that not
only does not take place, but perhaps . . . , as a matter of economic
efficiency, ought not to take place. ' 327 In fact, he went on, "we should
stop thinking about these consumer adhesion 'contracts' as contracts al-
together, and think about them as products, just like the products sold
pursuant to them. Once having established that outlook, one is better
able to discuss what governmental regulatory decisions ought to be made
about the quality of these 'products.' ",328 In Leffs opinion, this orienta-
tion had the advantage of forcing one to consider the costs of policing
consumer contracts through doctrines like unconscionability:
When you focus on something as a "contract," it is too easy to assume
that what doesn't fall on one party will fall on the other. Thus, if the
shift of a risk is held by the court bureaucracy to be "unconscionable,"
it will somehow come to rest on the party whose attempted shift was
frustrated. When, however, one thinks of the situation as involving a
directive to a manufacturer not to sell risky or defective "goods" to the
public, one is more likely to recognize that the risk has not been
bounced permanently to the maker-seller, but has been lobbed back
temporarily, so that he can slip it into his price base and allocate it
ratably to the whole class of buyers. Thus, the net effect of a series of
decisions following Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. . . . would
be that all buyers of automobiles would eventually automatically
"buy" from the manufacturers an insurance policy covering any per-
sonal injuries which might arise from manufacturing defects in the cars
they bought. I suppose it is possible to believe that one can buy insur-
ance policies without having to pay premiums; it's just that I can't.329
Thus, refusing to enforce implied warranty disclaimers imposes costs
that inevitably are passed on to buyers in the form of higher prices for
the seller's goods.
Nothing said thus far is necessarily an argument for enforcing im-
plied warranty disclaimers. Indeed, the foregoing remarks are basically
just another statement of the familiar "socialization of risk" rationale for
the tremendous expansion in product liability that has occurred in recent
decades. 330 However, there are some objections to applying this well-
established policy in the present context by declaring implied warranty
disclaimers unconscionable. One obvious cost of this approach is that
the open-ended, discretionary, case-by-case nature of decision-making under the unconscionability
doctrine. See infra note 362 and accompanying text.
327. Leff II, supra note 1, at 352.
328. Id. at 352 n.18 (emphasis in original).
329. Id.
330. Eg., W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 7, § 98, at 692-93 (discussing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
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the higher prices normally associated with increased liability somewhat
limit the public's ability to purchase goods and (presumably) the overall
level of abundance. But the choice to accept such consequences was
made some time ago, and, until recently at least, has not been a major
source of distress. Over the past several years, however, there has been
increasing talk of a "crisis" in product liability law, as increasing liability
and increasing dollar recoveries have helped make product liability insur-
ance more expensive and difficult to obtain. 331 Even more recently, these
problems have been exacerbated by the possibility of mass liability for
injuries resulting from asbestos, toxic chemicals, and other substances.
33 2
While these problems are real and worrisome, it is doubtful whether the
enforcement of implied warranty disclaimers is the preferred method for
alleviating them. Of the many actual and suggested responses to the diffi-
culties generated by the socialization of risk strategy,3 33 perhaps the most
promising are those that preserve (or even enhance) the plaintiff's ability
to recover, but limit the dollar amount of that recovery.
3 34
2. The Problem of Nonoptimal Results
Another, perhaps more weighty, objection to socializing the risk of
defective products by denying enforcement to implied warranty disclaim-
ers concerns the likelihood that courts will frustrate the preferences of
some buyers by doing so. All things being equal, products accompanied
by an enforceable disclaimer are apt to be cheaper than products accom-
panied by an "insurance policy" against defects. 335 Purchasers who
deem the lower price worth the risk of encountering a defect can hardly
be dismissed as irrational. A policy of refusing to enforce disclaimers,
however, leaves such buyers with no way to exercise this preference.
Professor Alan Schwartz has illustrated the point with the following hy-
pothetical example:
Assume ... that a retailer is offering two contracts that are identical
except for one clause: the first contract, which costs $100, includes a
warranty against product defects, while the second contract, which
costs $90, includes a disclaimer of the warranty. The hypothetical re-
331. See, e.g., Leibman, When the Product Ticks: Products Liability and Statutes of Limitations,
11 IND. L. REV. 693, 694-99 (1978) (discussing various formulations of the problem and assessments
of its severity).
332. See, e.g., Lauter, Footing the Bill for Toxic Torts, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 31, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
333. See, e.g., Leibman, supra note 331, at 700-02.
334. One example is the emerging doctrine of comparative fault, which reduces the plaintiff's
recovery in proportion to the plaintiff's percentage contribution to the injury suffered. See, e.g.,
Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981).
335. Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053,
1056 (1977).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
tailer has customers for both contracts, but the state, by statute or judi-
cial opinion, . . . bans the warranty disclaimer. Under these
circumstances, the prohibition against warranty disclaimers neither
helps nor hurts those customers who would have purchased warranty
coverage. The prohibition, however, harms the customers who would
have purchased a contract disclaiming all warranties. These customers
apparently value the insurance against product defects provided by a
warranty less than they value other uses for their $10.336
"Therefore," Schwartz concludes, "the prohibition against disclaimers
yields a nonoptimal result: some buyers regard themselves as worse off
than [under] the ban, and no buyers regard themselves as better off."
3 3 7
As is obvious from earlier discussion, this example does not square
with the realities of most standard form contracting. In particular, it
assumes a degree of information, competence, and rationality3 3 8 that
most purchasers (especially consumer purchasers) do not possess. De-
spite its rather unempirical nature, however, the argument can be re-
stated in a more realistic fashion. It may be safe to assume that in many
cases the choice in question-whether to sacrifice a degree of legal pro-
tection in exchange for a lower price-is a function of personal traits
(mainly, attitudes toward risk) that are relatively enduring. If so, it
makes some sense to consider what option a particular buyer would have
chosen had he been fully informed at the time of the sale.3 3 9 Since it has
been assumed that this hypothetical informed choice rests on fairly stable
personal predilections, it also makes some sense to regard the denial of
that choice as frustrating the buyer's preferences. Thus reformulated,
the nonoptimality argument could still be a significant objection to a pol-
icy of refusing to enforce implied warranty disclaimers.
Even as restated, however, the objection hardly supports the blanket
enforcement of implied warranty disclaimers. For all the reasons dis-
cussed earlier, it is unlikely that most purchasers (especially consumer
purchasers) can bargain away standard-form disclaimers. Thus, the buy-
ers who would have wished to "purchase insurance" would be unable to
realize their assumed objective if disclaimers are enforced. What seems
to be needed to produce optimal results is some after-the-fact method for
determining the choice that a particular buyer would have made had he
been fully informed at the time of the sale. While this conclusion may
reflect a failure of imagination on my part, I find it difficult to see how
336. Id. at 1057-58.
337. Id. at 1058.
338. Professor Schwartz made just such assumptions for purposes of analysis. See id. at 1056.
339. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981) (standard form term not part
of agreement where party offering form has reason to believe that other party would not have as-
sented had he known that the form contained the term).
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the courts could make this determination with any degree of accuracy. 340
The buyer's testimony on the subject would almost certainly be unrelia-
ble, since those who have suffered losses from a product defect will inva-
riably claim (and even believe) that they would never have assented to
the disclaimer had they been aware of its existence and effect. In con-
sumer cases, at least, 341 the results produced by such attempted determi-
nations are likely to be no more optimal than those produced by either
the blanket enforcement of disclaimers or their blanket non-enforcement.
In other words, while the "nonoptimality" argument remains valid, there
seems to be no feasible method for correcting the problem it identifies.
3. The "Superdisclosure" Option
In the previous subsection, we saw that freedom of contract was a
weak reed on which to base the enforceability of implied warranty dis-
claimers. And immediately above we saw that, while refusing to enforce
disclaimers frustrates the choice some parties would have made if fully
informed, there seems to be no practicable after-the-fact method for mak-
ing this determination. Perhaps, though, both problems could be ad-
dressed by legal rules that promote informed choice at the time of the
sale.342 Specifically, courts might allow the disclaimer to be enforced
340. Id. Comment f contains the following suggestions:
[A] party who adheres to the other party's standard terms does not assent to a term if the
other party has reason to believe that the adhering party would not have accepted the
agreement if he had known that the agreement contained the particular term. Such a belief
or assumption may be shown by the prior negotiations or inferred from the circumstances.
Reason to believe may be inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre or oppressive, from
the fact that it eviscerates the non-standard terms explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that
it eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction. The inference is reinforced if the
adhering party never had an opportunity to read the term, or if it is illegible or otherwise
hidden from view. This rule is closely related to the policy against unconscionable terms
and the rule of interpretation against the draftsman.
Implied warranty disclaimers hardly qualify as "bizarre or oppresive," and, since they negate a
warranty created by operation of law, can hardly be said to "eviscerate the non-standard terms
explicitly agreed to." Occasionally, though, an implied warranty disclaimer might be said to "elimi-
nate the dominant purpose of the transaction." See supra notes 320-21 and accompanying text
(discussing the A & M Produce case).
341. In commercial cases, however, the situation may be a bit different. As suggested in note
340, negotiations may be helpful in determining the buyer's assumed intention, and negotiations are
certainly more likely in commercial cases. Another factor that may be helpful in commercial cases is
the presence of past deals involving disclaimers. Also, a product's ability to produce severe (foresee-
able consequential damages if defective might reasonably convince a court that the buyer would not
have acquiesced to the disclaimer. This factor may be present in some consumer situations, but is
more likely in business contexts involving the possibility of indirect economic loss. Even when fac-
tors of the sort just described are present, however, determining what the buyer would have chosen
still seems to involve a significant measure of guesswork. Also, note that where negotiations involve
implied warranty disclaimers themselves the nonoptimality problem is far less likely to arise because
it is likely that the buyer is aware of the disclaimer and its effect.
342. Current law attempts to promote this goal to some degree. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2302
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where standards of "superconscionability 343 in the form of "superdis-
closure" have been observed by the seller and have made it highly prob-
able that the buyer was aware of the risks associated with a disclaimer.
The Possibilities. What kinds of seller disclosure might be effectual?
In rough order of ascending effectiveness, the possibilities include; posi-
tioning the disclaimer outside the product's package, making it stand in
violent contrast to the rest of the sale contract, requiring the buyer to
sign separately near the disclaimer, disclosing its existence on conspicu-
ous signs where the product is sold, pointing it out to the buyer, and/or
explaining its effect to the buyer. Since such disclosure is unlikely to be
meaningful in the absence of genuine choice, sellers should also be re-
quired to offer the buyer the option of buying the product with the dis-
claimer or without it. By insulating disclaimers accepted after such steps
have been taken while invalidating most other disclaimers, the courts
would seem to be creating substantial incentives for full disclosure. In
the process, they would also be overcoming the obstacles to free, know-
ing choice and optimal buyer satisfaction that have been discussed above.
Unfortunately, however, there are a number of problems with this ap-
proach. These problems are most evident in the consumer context, and,
in order to make these difficulties vivid, that context will be emphasized
here. 344
The Degree of Necessary Disclosure. The first problem with the
superdisclosure option concerns the degree of disclosure necessary to
produce the required high probability of buyer awareness. In consumer
cases, at least, methods such as placing the disclaimer outside the pack-
age, using a sale contract with a superconspicuous disclaimer, placing the
disclaimer on a sign, or requiring a separate signature do not seem likely
to attract the buyer's attention and stimulate his understanding with the
needed reliability. Worse yet, even the most effective forms of notice are
apt to be poorly understood if phrased in the legalese required by U.C.C.
section 2-316(2). Perhaps these objections could be overcome by using
more effective methods of communicating the option the seller is present-
ing (e.g., very conspicuous, detailed signs or a verbal explanation) and
stating that option in commonsense terms (e.g., explaining it as a choice
between a higher-priced product with an "insurance policy" and a lower-
(1982) and 16 C.F.R. §§ 701, 702 (1984) (Magnuson-Moss Act provisions and accompanying FTC
regulations requiring full and conspicuous disclosure of warranty terms and conditions).
343. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
344. See infra text following note 359 for a discussion of how these factors affect the enforceabil-
ity of implied warranty disclaimers in the commercial content.
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priced product without one). 3 4 5 Even this course of behavior, however,
does not appear completely satisfactory. For one thing, the colloquial
"insurance policy" explanation would be misleading if it fails to convey
the message that implied warranty liability is the only thing at issue,
346
and explaining why this is important requires some exegesis of product
liability law. Also, it should be evident that the kinds of notice most
likely to generate buyer awareness are also the most burdensome for
sellers. 34
7
The Disincentives to Use Superdisclosure. The burdens imposed on
sellers by the more effective forms of superdisclosure have other implica-
tions for this tactic's viability. First, such methods will almost certainly
raise the costs associated with sales transactions, 348 and this increased
cost presumably will be reflected in the price of the seller's goods.349 For
this reason and others, secondly, it is unclear whether sellers will be in-
clined to pursue superdisclosure at all. Explaining why this is so requires
that we examine the reasons why sellers employ standard form contracts
in the first place.3 50 In part, they do so to tame the external environment
by minimizing both the likelihood of legal liability and legal uncertainty
generally. 351 Plainly, enforceable implied warranty disclaimers advance
both of these goals.
But the use of standard forms also reflects forces that spring less
from the need to tame the external environment than from internal insti-
tutional imperatives. As Professor Rakoff explains:
Form documents promote efficiency within a complex organiza-
tional structure. First, the standardization of terms ... facilitates co-
ordination among departments. The costs of communicating special
understandings rise rapidly when one department makes the sale, an-
other delivers the goods, a third handles collections, and a fourth fields
345. Section 2-316's tests, of course, remain a minimum requirement for the enforceability of
implied warranty disclaimers. And technical compliance with U.C.C. § 2-316 will still be necessary.
346. For example, disclaimers of negligence and § 402A liability are quite unlikely to be effective
in consumer cases. See supra notes 36-37. It might be argued that superdisclosure should validate
such disclaimers, but this is rather unlikely, since in both cases equal bargaining power is necessary.
347. On the other hand, it is possible that over time consumers will become acquainted with the
issues implied warranty disclaimers present, and that the more extreme methods of disclosure will
eventually become unnecessary as a result.
348. See Rakoff, supra note 274, at 1221; Schwartz, supra note 335, at 1064-65.
349. In fact, it has been suggested that "[t]he costs incurred when a seller drafts and administers
a particularized agreement often exceed the additional benefit a buyer would derive from such an
agreement." Schwartz, supra note 335, at 1065. On the other hand, however, this increased cost
must be balanced against the reduction in price attributable to the lower seller liability that superdis-
closure could produce.
350. The discussion in the following two paragraphs is mainly based on Rakoff, supra note 274,
at 1220-25. For other discussions of the reasons firms use standard forms, see RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 211, Comment a (1981); Slawson, supra note 283, at 530-32, 552.
351. Rakoff, supra note 274, at 1221.
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complaints. Standard terms make it possible to process transactions as
a matter of routine; standard forms, with standard blank spaces, make
it possible to locate rapidly whatever deal has been struck on the few
customized items. Second, standardization makes possible the efficient
use of expensive managerial and legal talent. Standard forms facilitate
the diffusion to underlings of management's decisions regarding the
risks the organization is prepared to bear, or make it unnecessary to
explain these matters to subordinates at all. Third, the use of form
contracts serves as an automatic check on the consequences of the acts
of wayward sales personnel. The pressure to produce may tempt sales-
men to make bargains into which the organization is unwilling to
enter; the use of standard form contracts to state the terms of the deal
obviates much of the need for, and expense of, internal control and
discipline in this regard.
352
These factors militate against the use of superdisclosure to avoid the
judicial negation of implied warranty disclaimers. For one thing, giving
buyers the choice described above would probably make "communicat-
ing special understandings" and "coordination among departments"
somewhat more difficult for organizations. But the resulting problems of
communication and coordination are not likely to be overwhelming,
since the buyer has only two alternatives and his choice can easily be
indicated on the form. The real problems involve the crucial role that
salespeople will play in making any such scheme effective. Since true
purchaser understanding of the available options seems to require that
the sales force be equipped to explain these options, its training becomes
a matter of vital concern. Also, no matter what form of disclosure the
firm adopts, the Gales force will be required to implement it. This neces-
sitates a greater degree of higher-level supervision as well. All these re-
quirements tend to make the organization's internal functioning less
smooth than would otherwise be the case. As noted earlier, they also
consume time and resources, thus raising transaction costs. Finally, be-
cause they increase the responsibilities and importance of salespeople,
these measures tend to alter the corporation's internal power structure in
ways uncongenial to top managers. 353 For all these reasons, some sellers
352. Id. at 1222-23.
353. [Florm documents help to solidify the organization's internal power structure. In pri-
vate organizations, as in public bureaucracies, discretion is power-and this is true of dis-
cretion at the bottom of the hierarchy as well as at the top. As subordinates are given
wider discretion, they become more difficult to discipline, because standards of perform-
ance are less clear. From the point of view of an organization that desires to maintain
internal hierarchy, the most desirable salespeople are nearly interchangeable: they sell a
standard product at a standard price on standard terms. When price is negotiable, the
employee's status increases somewhat. If all terms were negotiable, a much greater degree
of training and ability-and consequently of status and reward-would be required. In-
stead, the routinization of transactions through the use of standard forms reserves discre-
tion for positions further up the organizational hierarchy.
Id. at 1223.
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may decide that superdisclosure is simply not worth its intraorganiza-
tional costs. This is especially so since, as noted above, the forms of dis-
closure that most effectively reduce liability are also the most
burdensome to the firm.
Another reason why sellers may be disinclined to pursue superdis-
closure involves a more obvious corporate imperative: the pursuit of
sales. In some situations, at least, superdisclosure could be a poor mar-
keting tactic. It is likely that a substantial number of purchasers (espe-
cially consumer purchasers) have little interest in the terms of their sales
contracts and that superdisclosure is unlikely to stimulate their interest.
In fact, the most effective methods of disclosure may arouse their antipa-
thy, since these methods will inevitably slow the pace at which sales are
made. Even buyers who desire to be informed about contract terms may
find their interest fading as superdisclosure produces its inevitable delays.
And their desire to patronize establishments devoted to enhanced disclo-
sure may fade as well.
Paternalism and Undesirable Risk Allocation. The last set of diffi-
culties with superdisclosure 354 differs considerably from those just dis-
cussed. As we have seen, the aim of the superdisclosure requirement is to
recreate the conditions of free contractual choice and thus to produce
buyer decisions that are optimal from an economic point of view. But
why, it might be argued, attach such importance to free choice and opti-
mal economic results? Instead, why not adopt the frankly paternalistic
position that certain buyers need protection from some of the choices
they make? This argument seems most compelling in cases where con-
sumers suffer personal injury. 355 It is buttressed by the natural tendency
of purchasers not to focus on the contingencies with which standard
forms deal.
A related consideration is the likelihood that superdisclosure will
produce a less-than-ideal allocation of losses in situations where the dis-
claimer is upheld and the buyer cannot recover from the seller. 356 Here,
the loss resulting from the product defect may deplete the buyer's savings
or other resources, a result that is not desirable from a socialization of
risk perspective. Also, this result may have consequences for the pur-
chaser's dependents, parties who in no way assented to the risk of a de-
354. Actually, these objections apply to the "freedom of contract" and "optimality" arguments
discussed earlier as well.
355. For example, it is difficult to imagine that superdisclosure would validate a disclaimer of
§ 402A liability in a personal injury case. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Com-
ment m (1965) and supra note 37.
356. The arguments in this paragraph come from Franklin, supra note 176, at 1010 n.214 (1966).
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fect. Of course, the economic consequences of a disclaimable product
defect may be "spread around" if the buyer's losses are covered by insur-
ance357 or are paid for by charity. Here, however, the loss will not fall on
the party (the manufacturer) best situated to avoid the occurrence of the
defect.
4. Summary
This subsection's discussion of the economic arguments for enforc-
ing implied warranty disclaimers has tended to emphasize the consumer
context more than its commercial counterpart. On the whole, this dis-
cussion does little to upset my earlier conclusion that implied warranty
disclaimers should not be enforced in consumer cases. Indeed, by intro-
ducing the socialization of risk perspective, the preceding discussion has
strengthened the case for negating implied warranty disclaimers accom-
panying consumer sales. However, socialization of risk has its associated
costs, most notably the tendency to produce nonoptimal economic re-
sults. As we have seen, though, there appear to be no feasible means for
rectifying this situation. It is difficult, if not impossible, for the courts to
make accurate after-the-fact judgments about the choices consumers
would have made had they been fully informed at the time of the sale.
Moreover, the attempt to induce genuine choice via superdisclosure is
also beset with problems. Whether these problems are sufficient for a
definitive rejection of superdisclosure, however, is not completely certain.
Thus, it will be preserved as a possible alternative for the time being.
Where the "business" purchaser is in reality indistinguishable from
an ordinary consumer, the points just made appreciably weaken the case
for enforcing implied warranty disclaimers in commercial cases. This is
arguably the case in many situations where a small-to-medium-sized
business actor deals with a large corporation. In other business contexts,
however, the preceding discussion probably strengthens the case for en-
forcing implied warranty disclaimers. Since many business parties are
relatively well-equipped to bear the costs associated with defective goods,
the socialization of risk rationale is less applicable to them. In fact, some
large corporate buyers may be able to pass on these costs to their custom-
ers, thus eliminating most of the risk-distribution arguments for impos-
357. Cf Epstein, supra note 1, at 311 (1975) (suggesting that, in remedy limitation context,
preferred solution to enforce limitation and let market allocate risks by buyer's purchase of insur-
ance). Leaving aside the question whether such insurance is generally available to consumers, the
objection to this proposal from the present perspective is simply that many consumers will not
purchase such insurance and that they should not be left to suffer the consequences of their choice.
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ing liability on the seller.358 In addition, enforcing disclaimers may
produce economically optimal results in certain business transactions. In
some deals of this sort, the parties may have explicitly bargained the
terms of the disclaimer, or the buyer may have been aware of the dis-
claimer and its legal consequences. Even where this has not occurred,
moreover, after-the-fact judgments on the course the buyer would have
taken if fully informed may occasionally be possible in the business con-
text.359 Finally, the superdisclosure option is far more viable for business
buyers than for consumer buyers. Here, less in the way of notice and
explanation will ordinarily be required to generate the desired level of
purchaser awareness and understanding. Where the sale is a sizeable
"one-shot" deal, the organizational disincentives toward full disclosure
would seem less pressing. And paternalistic arguments have relatively
little weight where the object of concern is a business entity.
These considerations considerably enhance the case for enforcing
implied warranty disclaimers where both parties to the contract are large
corporations. However, they strengthen the case only marginally where
the contracting parties are two small-to-medium-sized firms. In this
case, the buyer is in little position to pass on the costs of a product defect.
Also, superdisclosure is somewhat less likely to be effective due to such
firms' lower than average organization, business sophistication, and abil-
ity to obtain legal help. As already suggested, finally, the same consider-
ations apply with more force where a small-to-medium-sized business
actor purchases from a large corporation. Here, the case for enforcing
implied warranty disclaimers is often rather weak.
D. The "Rule of Law" and Related Concerns
1. The Problem and Its Genesis
Although formulations of the term "the rule of law" vary, 360 at the
core of its traditional statement are the notions of certainty and predict-
ability. To Friedrich Hayek, the rule of law "means that government in
all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand-rules
which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority
will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one's indi-
358. See, e.g., Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir.
1979) (using this argument as one basis for holding § 402A inapplicable to commercial deals between
large corporations).
359. See supra note 341.
360. See, e.g., W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 10, at 500-05 (rejecting traditional conception of rule
of law identifying it with fixity of legal rules and absence of discretionary state power, and attempt-
ing formulation relevant to modem conditions).
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vidual affairs on the basis of this knowledge. ' 361 Obviously, the "rule" of
unconscionability announced by U.C.C. section 2-302 fails to satisfy this
criterion. Indeed, the indeterminacy of the unconscionability doctrine
was the major reason for Professor Left's famous 1967 assault on section
2-302.362 Needless to say, section 2-302's formlessness is quite apparent
in the decisions applying the unconscionability doctrine to implied war-
ranty disclaimers. On rule of law grounds, in other words, this body of
law seems quite deficient.
The indeterminacy of which Leff complained, however, is an almost
inevitable response to twentieth century social realities. Open-ended, dis-
cretionary standards pervade modem law. Many of them reflect the fact
that precision is self-defeating where government intervenes in a com-
plex, variegated social environment. In such an environment, the rele-
vant factors of decision vary from case to case, and it is frequently
impossible to predict either their incidence or their effects in advance.
Thus, legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts announce broad,
flexible standards that facilitate the exercise of case-by-case discretion.
As Roberto Mangabeira Unger once noted:
As government assumes managerial responsibilities, it must work in
areas in which the complexity and variability of relevant factors of de-
cision seem too great to allow for general rules, whence the recourse to
vague standards. These standards need to be made concrete and indi-
vidualized by persons charged with their administrative or judicial
execution. 363
Thus, "the courts may be charged to police unconscionable contracts, to
void unjust enrichment, to control economic concentration so as to main-
tain competitive markets, or to determine whether a government agency
has acted in the public interest.
' 364
Courts utilizing U.C.C. section 2-302 are plainly assuming "mana-
gerial responsibilities." The section is but one example of a familiar phe-
nomenen; government intervention into private contracts. As we have
361. F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (Phoenix paperback ed. 1944).
362. Leff began by terming his article "a study in statutory pathology," Leff, supra note 1, at
485, and he elaborated the point later in the article's introduction. After stating the test of section 2-
302, for example, he remarked that: "If reading this section makes anything clear it is that reading
this section alone makes nothing clear about the meaning of 'unconscionable' except perhaps that it
is perjorative." Id. at 487. Shortly thereafter, he attacked "section 2-302's final amorphous unintel-
ligibility and its accompanying commentary's final irrelevance." Id. at 488. He concluded his intro-
duction by stating that: "The central purpose of this paper will be to illustrate the progressive
abstraction, attenuation and eventual destruction of meaning in an important single statutory provi-
sion, in response to pressures the nature of which can only be guessed." Id. at 489.
363. R.M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARDS A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY
196 (paperback ed. 1976).
364. Id. at 194.
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seen, this intervention has been prompted by the demise of the nineteenth
century assumption of contractual equality and the "negative state" pos-
ture that this assumption made possible. Courts attempting to police un-
fair bargains under section 2-302 must consider the many kinds and
sources of contractual unfairness (e.g., the list of substantive and proce-
dural factors discussed earlier). These factors of decision will be present
in different degrees and will have different effects over the wide range of
factual contexts the courts confront. In each discrete context of decision,
finally, these factors must somehow be weighed against each other. Such
a decision-making process seems to necessitate an indeterminate legal
standard like section 2-302's unconscionability doctrine.
From the above, it should be evident that cries for a return to "the
rule of law" can be covert attacks on government regulation. Since in
many instances the regulatory process must be discretionary if it is to be
effective, the demand for certainty is in substance a demand that the reg-
ulation cease or be ineffectual. However, this was not Leff's position.
Instead, as Rakoff notes, "Leff suggested a broad program of legislation
coupled with administrative enforcement, directed in part to requiring
greater disclosure of terms, but aimed primarily at the outright prohibi-
tion of particular clauses and devices in adhesion contracts. ' 365 In fact,
Leff had few qualms about the outright legislative prohibition of implied
warranty disclaimers in consumer cases. 366 In light of the considerations
raised in the preceding paragraph, however, it is doubtful whether the
Leff program is workable across the full range of fact-patterns where im-
plied warranty disclaimers are attacked as unconscionable. In commer-
cial cases, at least, the relevant variables appear too many and too evenly
balanced to permit a clear, tidy legislative or administrative resolution of
the question.
2. Implications and Conclusions
Despite everything said so far, legal certainty and predictability
surely have some value and thus have some bearing on the approach
courts should take when determining whether implied warranty dis-
claimers are unconscionable. The standards applied in deciding this
question, in other words, should be as definite and predictable as possible
without unduly compromising other relevant values. In the present con-
text, the main interest promoted by "rule of law" certainty is the assist-
365. Rakoff, supra note 274, at 1207. See Leff II, supra note 1, at 351-58.
366. See Leff, supra note 1, at 254.
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ance it gives to private planning.3 6 7 As we have seen, one of the reasons
firms use standard-form terms is to tame the external environment by
making it more predictable. The terms can hardly accomplish this task if
the rules controlling their enforceability are unclear. Specifically, clear
rules governing the enforceability of implied warranty disclaimers give
sellers, manufacturers, and their insurers some basis on which to predict
the economic consequences of product defects and to plan accordingly.
While legal certainty plainly is of some value, however, it is difficult to
assess its actual importance to affected firms or its significance relative to
other values affecting the enforceability of implied warranty disclaimers.
But it is possible to suggest the direction in which "rule of law" concerns
push the analysis made above.
Consumer Cases. In consumer cases, this article has tentatively
reached a conclusion that, while no doubt unsatisfactory to sellers and
manufacturers, at least affords them considerable certainty. This conclu-
sion, of course, is that implied warranty disclaimers generally should not
be enforced in consumer cases. However, there was one caveat to this
conclusion; the possibility that superdisclosure might occasionally vali-
date a disclaimer made to a consumer. But the considerations raised im-
mediately above seem to drive the final nail into the coffin of consumer
superdisclosure. As discussed previously, it is extremely difficult to de-
termine the degree of disclosure needed to generate the consumer knowl-
edge and understanding necessary for superdisclosure to achieve its
goals. Thus, preserving the superdisclosure option for sellers is hardly
likely to enhance certainty in the legal standards governing the enforce-
ability of implied warranty disclaimers. 3 68 As a result, virtually all of the
367. See supra text accompanying note 361.
368. However, there is another consideration which complicates and qualifies this conclusion a
bit. The consumer, presumably, has interests in certainty and the ability to plan that rival the seller's
interest. But in order for either interest to be furthered in the implied warranty disclaimer context,
the consumer must at least have: 1) knowledge of the disclaimer's existence and effect (something
the seller can be assumed to possess); and 2) legal certainty in the sense described in the text.
Superdisclosure generally increases the likelihood that the buyer will know of the disclaimer's exist-
ence, while decreasing legal certainty. However, if the disclosure is truly exhaustive and effective,
both factors would seem to be maximized. Such seller behavior, that is, makes it very likely that the
buyer will know about the disclaimer and appreciate its impact, and also creates a minimum of
uncertainty about its enforceability. Thus, it could be argued that a seller loophole for "super-
superdisclosure" should still be retained. But there are at least two reasons why this seems inadvisa-
ble. First, since such extreme disclosure imposes all kinds of burdens on sellers, sellers pursuing this
option are under intraorganizational pressure to cut corners in their disclosure programs. See supra
notes 352-53 and accompanying text. Second, consumer plaintiffs may often claim that, despite the
extreme methods of disclosure used, they truly did not understand the disclaimer and its effect; and
courts may give weight to such testimony. Imagine that a consumer buys a product for a lower price
after full disclosure of the accompanying disclaimer and its operation. If this buyer later suffers
personal injury due to a defect in the goods, he will be sorely tempted to claim that he did not really
understand the deal he was making. And courts influenced by socialization of risk arguments may
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relevant policy considerations 369 point to the conclusion that implied
warranty disclaimers should be per se unconscionable in consumer cases.
Commercial Cases. In commercial cases, the preceding analysis has
indicated that: 1) implied warranty disclaimers have a strong presump-
tion of enforceability where the seller and the buyer are both large corpo-
rations; 2) such disclaimers should often be enforced where both parties
are small-to-medium-sized business entities; and 3) the desirability of en-
forcement is questionable where a small-to-medium-sized business actor
buys from a large corporation. The reasons for these general conclusions
were many. In the first situation, the parties are likely to be in an equal
bargaining position, the buyer frequently will have the market power to
pass on the costs associated with defective goods, and buyer awareness of
the disclaimer and appreciation of its effect are most apt to be present. In
the second situation, we have a buyer whose ability to engage in risk-
spreading is doubtful, but who will often occupy a position of relative
equality with the seller, and who will sometimes possess the sophistica-
tion to know of the disclaimer and its impact. While such sophistication
and knowledge may also be present in the third situation, equal bargain-
ing power and the buyer's ability to pass on the costs of product defects
are fairly unlikely. In all three cases, though, the range of possibilities is
so vast that precise legal rules seem impossible. The parties, their size,
bargaining power, and business sophistication, and their appreciation of
the disclaimer and its impact all will vary to such an extent that open-
ended standards appear inevitable if case-by-case justice is to be done.
From a "rule of law" perspective, this situation is unfortunate. Is it
possible to systematize the relevant factors of decision and thus achieve a
modicum of predictability? The standards commonly used to determine
the enforceability of liability waivers in negligence cases 370 seem able to
further this objective. Although formulations of the applicable test differ
be inclined to give weight to testimony of that sort. They also would be disinclined to give preclusive
effect to the seller's adoption of a certain superconscionability ritual, since the crucial question is the
buyer's actual knowledge and understanding. For both reasons, the certainty seemingly provided by
"super-superconscionability" seems a bit illusory.
369. However, this result does compromise the optimality criterion discussed at supra notes 335-
41 and accompanying text. That is, consumers who would have opted for a lower price and a
disclaimer had they been fully informed will not be able to exercise this hypothetical preference.
370. One objection to the use of negligence standards is that tort rules should not be employed in
a contract context. Here, though, such an objection is the emptiest of empty formalisms. The
implied warranty of merchantability is, as Professors White and Summers note, the "first cousin to
strict tort liability." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 9-6, at 343. Moreover, it is probably
safe to say that in most cases where the seller is liable under the implied warranty of merchantability,
negligence or something quite like it is present (if not always provable). Finally, the unconscionabil-
ity doctrine seems sufficiently open-ended to accomodate legal standards that technically are not
contractual.
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somewhat, several factors recur in the cases discussing the enforceability
of such waivers. The most important factors supporting enforceability
are: 1) a transaction between business entities (not a consumer
purchase); 2) relatively equal bargaining power between these parties;
3) genuine bargaining or negotiations regarding the waiver; and 4) con-
siderable explicitness in the terms of the waiver. 371 The first factor is
present by definition here. The fourth should be satisfied if the seller
adheres to the technical standards of U.C.C. section 2-316.372 (These
standards, of course, remain as minimum criteria for the enforceability of
any implied warranty disclaimer.) Remaining to be discussed, therefore,
are the two remaining criteria; the existence of relatively equal bargain-
ing power and the presence of genuine negotiations.
Equal bargaining power has not always been considered significant
by courts considering the unconscionability of implied warranty dis-
claimers in commercial cases. 373 In light of the realities discussed in the
opening portion of this section, however, such a requirement plainly is
necessary to make freedom of contract meaningful by preventing
stronger parties from imposing disclaimers. Absent this requirement,
genuine buyer assent to the disclaimer would be doubtful in many cases.
Moreover, the buyer's ability to bargain for an "insurance policy" (and
thus the policy of promoting optimal economic results) 374 would some-
times be frustrated. Under this general test, deals between large corpora-
tions375 and between smaller entities of equal size (the first two situations
outlined above) should usually pass muster. Transactions between cor-
porate giants and small-to-medium-sized firms, however, will be highly
suspect. But size is not always a reliable proxy for bargaining power.
376
"Much depends on the nature of the transaction, the nature of the prod-
uct, the relative knowledge of the parties concerning the product, and the
371. See supra note 36.
372. Courts also say that a waiver of negligence liability should be strictly construed. See supra
note 36. In the present context, however, this requirement appears to have little meaning, since
under U.C.C. § 2-316 we have precise standards governing the enforceability of disclaimer clauses
that have a quite precise effect.
373. See supra notes 231, 256, 262 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 335-37 and accompanying text.
375. Also, there is another consideration that supports the enforceability of disclaimers in cases
where the buyer and the seller are both large corporations. Large corporate buyers are sometimes
able to pass on the costs associated with product defects. Where this is true, it is not necessary to
impose liability on the seller in order for the risk to be socialized. See supra note 358 and accompa-
nying text.
376. However, there is obviously some connection between size and bargaining power. See, e.g.,
supra text following note 283 (suggesting that disparities of bargaining power spring less from out-
right compulsion than from disparities in business experience, business sophistication, etc.). There is
plainly some correlation between size and the possession of these attributes.
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availability of other products to fill the needs of the purchaser. ,377 In all
three situations, therefore, individualized consideration of such factors
may still be necessary.
Like equal bargaining power, the factor of genuine bargaining has
not always been deemed significant by courts deciding unconscionability
challenges to implied warranty disclaimers in the commercial context.
378
For a variety of reasons, however, this additional requirement 379 seems
desirable. Most importantly, the buyer's knowledge of the disclaimer is
virtually guaranteed where that disclaimer is the product of genuine bar-
gaining.380 Such knowledge is ordinarily crucial if the goals of optimal
results and predictable planning are to be achieved. In the absence of a
knowing bargain, there is little guarantee that a disclaimer actually re-
flects the buyer's preference to refuse an "insurance policy" in return for
a lower price. Moreover, it is difficult to see how firms can effectively
plan if their plans are affected by unknown risk-allocations.
Obviously, buyer knowledge of the disclaimer is possible in the ab-
sence of negotiations.38' Why, then, not make buyer knowledge,
382
rather than the presence of negotiations, the criterion? Earlier in the ar-
ticle, for example, I suggested that superdisclosure might sometimes jus-
tify the enforcement of an implied warranty disclaimer in commercial
cases,383 and that after-the-fact judgments about what the buyer would
have chosen if fully informed may be permissible in such cases. 384 How-
ever, there are two general reasons why the presence of genuine negotia-
tions seems to be a better criterion than simple buyer knowledge. First,
the buyer knowledge that accompanies genuine bargaining is apt to be of
377. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 143
Ariz. 368, 384, 694 P.2d 198, 214 (1985) (discussing transaction between two large corporations).
These considerations, however, apply in other contexts as well. The ready availability of substitute
products, for example, might give a small buyer some leverage when it bargains with a larger firm.
378. See supra notes 232, 256, 262 and accompanying text.
379. While relatively equal bargaining power may be necessary for genuine negotiations, it
hardly guarantees their presence. Some large corporate buyers, for example, may passively accept
their sellers' standard-form disclaimers.
380. Cf Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 288-89 (3d
Cir. 1980) (enforceability of freely bargained waivers of negligence liability reflects idea that such
bargaining can achieve more rational allocation of risks than law would otherwise allow, and this
rationale, in turn, presupposes that contracting parties have actually considered the negative costs of
insuring against negligent design and manufacture).
381. Some business or commercial buyers, for example, may possess the business sophistication
and experience to recognize an unbargained disclaimer in the seller's contract, but may passively
accept it. The same result may occur even if the disclaimer's existence has been pointed out by the
seller.
382. Here, of course, I refer to actual knowledge, and reject the tendency for some courts to
impute such knowledge to business or commercial buyers. On this tendency, see supra note 255.
383. See supra text following note 359.
384. See supra notes 340-41, 359 and accompanying text.
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a different order than knowledge received in more passive ways (includ-
ing superdisclosure). Where the disclaimer results from real negotia-
tions, it is more likely that the buyer has fully considered its impact
before assenting to it. Since effective planning and the achievement of
optimal economic results are somewhat dependent on such deliberation,
these goals are best advanced where actual negotiations have occurred.
Secondly, the main concern of this subsection-legal certainty and
predictability-tips the scales in favor of making negotiations the stan-
dard. Even under the best of circumstances, determining what a hypo-
thetical fully informed buyer would have chosen is beset with difficulties.
And determining whether the buyer actually was aware of the disclaimer
at the time of the sale also poses problems. Presumably, the buyer's own
testimony is entitled to some weight in resolving this question. But even
buyers who really knew of the disclaimer at the time of the sale will have
a natural inclination to testify to the contrary if the product turns out to
be defective and losses result. While seller superdisclosure may some-
times render such claims implausible in the commercial context, the de-
gree of superdisclosure needed for genuine buyer awareness is still
somewhat uncertain.3 5 In comparison, the presence or absence of real
negotiations appears easier to ascertain. Since negotiations are objective
events involving more than one person, establishing their existence is less
dependent on the testimony of the buyer or its employees. Such bargain-
ing may also be evidenced by letters and other writings. In some cases,
finally, there may be third-party witnesses to the negotiations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Among the many crosscurrents affecting the drafting of Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code was the clash between nineteenth century
freedom of contract ideas and the more protective, interventionist spirit
that has often prevailed in the twentieth century. In few instances is this
more evident than in Article 2's rules governing implied warranties and
seller disclaimers of these warranties. Reflecting the interventionist cli-
mate produced by the social changes that undermined classic nineteenth
century contract law, the drafters followed the lead of the Uniform Sales
Act 386 by including the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness.
At the same time, however, they significantly diluted the impact of these
warranties by giving sellers broad freedom of contract-based powers to
385. See supra notes 344-47 and accompanying text (referring to the consumer context). Also,
there are various intraorganizational reasons why sellers may be disinclined to pursue superdis-
closure in the first place. See supra notes 352-53 and accompanying text.
386. See UNIFORM SALES ACT §§ 15(1), (2).
UNCONSCIONABILITY AND ARTICLE 2 267
disclaim them. The resulting tension between nineteenth and twentieth
century conceptions of contractual freedom and the government's role in
maintaining it made for an unstable admixture. And, while various eco-
nomic arguments for enforcing implied warranty disclaimers may have
helped to reduce this tension, they failed to eliminate it. Eventually, it
seems, the incongruity between Article 2's implied warranties and its
easy-to-use disclaimer provisions has been resolved in favor of the for-
mer. By now, implied warranty disclaimers can be readily attacked
under section 2-302's all-purpose ban on unconscionable contract
clauses. Still, the courts applying section 2-302 to implied warranty dis-
claimers have sometimes been tentative in their use of this regulatory
tool. The general movement of product liability law, and the policy con-
siderations underlying that movement, however, argue for a more aggres-
sive judicial stance in this area.
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